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On July 4, 1994, Nye County Commissioner Richard Carver drove
a bulldozer through the Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada and cleared
a road.' Carver ignored the federal agent ordering him to halt; as the
bulldozer moved forward, the agent jumped out of its way.2 The agent,
* Copyright 1995 by Carolyn M. Landever, B.A., Yale University; J.D., New York
University School of Law. The author is an attorney in Washington, D.C., and has no
professional, associational or financial relationship bearing on the matters discussed herein.
1. Ed Vogel, Nye's CarverLeads Fightfor Land Use, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 7, 1995,
at IA; Vincent J. Schodolski, Range Wars: Nevada Struggle Emblematic of Battle to Put Public
Land Strictly in Counties' Hands, S.F. EXAMINER, May 21, 1995, at A6.
2. Vogel, supra note 1, at 1A.
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a Forest Service worker, was arrested by Nye County officials for his
protest.3 The basis for the authority asserted by Carver and the County
was Resolution 93-48, adopted by the Nye County Board of Commissioners, which declares that the "State of Nevada owns all public lands
within the borders of the State of Nevada [see Nev. Rev. Stat. §
321.5973] and the Counties of Nevada have a duty to manage these
lands, to protect all private rights held on these lands,
4 and to preserve
local customs, culture, economy, and environment.,
On March 6, 1995 the United States Department of Justice filed suit
against Nye County, Nevada.' Citing the Toiyabe road clearing, a
similar unauthorized opening of the San Juan Canyon Road, Nye County
Resolutions 93-48 and 93-49,6 and Nye County warnings that federal
employees attempting to enforce federal regulations in Nye County are
subject to criminal sanctions for acting outside the scope of their
authority, the United States sought a declaratory judgment confirming
federal rights to the "lands within Nye County presently owned by the
United States."7
The Nye County action is one example of numerous county actions
in the West.' This "county movement" is part of a general trend toward
state legislative growth, and against a federal government that is seen to

3. ForestService Gives Workers "Arrest" Cards-FederalEmployees Could Be Caught
in Front Lines of "Sagebrush Rebellion," SEAT=LE TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, at BI.
4. NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.5973, enacted by the Nevada state legislature in 1979 during
the "Sagebrush Rebellion," declares that "[slubject to existing rights, all public lands in Nevada
and all minerals not previously appropriated are the property of the State of Nevada and subject
to its jurisdiction and control." See also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 321.596-.599 (describing the nature
and extent of Nevada state control over public lands).
5. United States v. Nye County, Nev., No. CV-S-95-00232-LDG (RJJ) (D. Nev. filed
Mar. 6,1995) [hereinafter Nye County Complaint]; see United States v. Nye County, Nev., 920
F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996) (granting United States' motion for summary judgment).
6. Nye County Resolution 93-49, also relying upon NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 321.596-.599,
declares that all roads and other public travel corridors (with limited exception) on public lands
within Nye County are Nye County public roads.
7. Nye County Complaint, supra note 5. As a corollary, the United States sought a
declaratory judgment that §§ 321.596-.599 and Resolutions 93-48 and 93-49 are preempted by
federal law, as well as an injunction against County interference with federal management of
federal lands within Nye County. Id.
8. According to the Department of Justice, 35 counties have passed (and 35 other
counties are thinking of passing) "anti-federal ordinances or resolutions" since the late 1980s.
See Maria L. LaGanga, Nevada Range War Pits U.S., Nye County: Sovereignty: Tensions Rise
in Ongoing Challenge to Federal Authority Over Land, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al.
Richard Carver, a Nye County commissioner and a leader of the "county movement," believes
the number to be significantly higher; he estimates that almost 300 counties have passed or are
considering such county-rights measures. Id.
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be intruding upon the reserved powers of the states and ultimately upon
individual liberty.
Claims such as those made by Nye County, of state ownership and/or
control of the public lands within a state's borders, often are considered
by scholars and critics to be frivolous, even absurd.9 State governments
often have agreed that the claims are baseless. Nevada Attorney General
Frankie Sue Del Papa, for example, has replied to "county rights
advocates" that" '[t]here has been little or no mention of the vast body
of law which contradicts your position. I think you owe it to the people
whom you address to explain its existence.' "" But are the claims so
unfounded? Reexamination of the issue suggests a plausible, even
substantial, argument in favor of state jurisdiction over, and private
party ownership of, the unappropriated "public" lands in the West.
Together, the "equal footing" doctrine and the Article IV Property
Clause provide a solid basis for this position."

9. For example, Greg Hicks, a Professor of Public Land Law at the University of
Washington, calls the argument "spurious." Rob Taylor, Meet a Man Who Would Get U.S. Out
of the West-He Preaches Takeover of FederalLand, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 31,
1995, at Al. David Schuman, an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Oregon, has
said that" '[t]hese initiatives are utterly frivolous, and they have absolutely no constitutional
basis whatsoever.' " Dana Tims, 4 Counties Voting on Sagebrush Rebellion, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Mar. 26, 1995, at Dl. Peter Coppelman, deputy assistant attorney general,
Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, says " '[tihis is an
entirely erroneous interpretation of the equal footing doctrine.' "Jill Conley, County Supremacy
OrdinancesAre Unconstitutional-Coppelman,NACO COUNTY NEWS, June 5, 1995, at 16; see
also George C. Coggins, Some DisjointedObservationson FederalPublic Land and Resources
Law, 11 EwT'. L. 471,495 (1981) (commenting on the "exotic variations on the 'equal footing'
doctrine said to be expressed in Pollard'sLessee, a long-forgotten 1845 opinion"); Letter from
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, State of Nevada, to Edward L. Presley, Executive
Director, County Alliance to Restore the Economy and Environment (Sept. 17, 1993) ("your
legal theory [of equal footing] is unconventional and it was rejected by the court").
10. Christopher A. Wood, The Warfor Western Lands-It Was Never Theirs, But Militant
Counties Aim to "Retake" FederalDomain, WASH. POST, May 7, 1995, at C2.
11. Noteworthy articles concerning power over the public lands, in the last 15 years,
include: Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment:An IntergovernmentalPerspective of
the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENvTL. L. 847 (1982); Albert W. Brodie, Question of Enumerated
Powers: ConstitutionalIssues SurroundingFederalOwnershipof the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J.
693 (1981); George C. Coggins et al., The Law of Public RangelandManagement I: The Extent
and Distributionof Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535 (1982); Coggins, supra note 9, at 471;
Richard H. Cowart & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and
Administrative Reality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 375 (1988); David Engdahl, State and FederalPower
Over FederalProperty, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283 (1976); Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic"
Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617 (1985); Dale D. Goble, The Myth of the Classic
Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REv. 495 (1986); John Leshy, Unravelling the
Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317
(1980); Note, The PropertyPower, Federalism,and the Equal FootingDoctrine, 80 COLUM. L.
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The Property Clause-Article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the United
States Constitution-is the more familiar constitutional provision. The
Property Clause provides the federal government with the power to
dispose of and regulate property: "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
the United States, or of any particular State."' 2 The implications of the
Property Clause are not clear, however. In particular, the meaning of the
terms "dispose of' and "belonging to the United States" are disputed by
those on opposite sides of the lands debate.
The equal footing doctrine is a less familiar constitutional doctrine,
and its implications are even more disputed. According to the equal
footing doctrine, all states, from the original thirteen to the latest,
Alaska, are admitted to the United States as equal states, on an equal
footing with all other states. 3 To maintain that constitutional position,
the Supreme Court has held that all of the states must have the same
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and political rights as did the original states. 4
The implications of this "equality"-for example, whether all states
therefore are equally entitled to jurisdiction over all lands within their
state borders-are disputed."
Challenges about the equality of the states have been fueled by the
disproportional federal ownership of lands in the fifty states. In the
twelve states in the West, the federal government owns from 28%
(Washington) to 88% (Alaska) of all lands within the states' respective
borders. 6 Alaska alone accounts for 45% of all public lands owned by

REV. 817 (1980) [hereinafter Note, The Property Power]; Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who
Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505 [hereinafter Note, The Sagebrush
Rebellion].
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
13. For a detailed history and description of the equal footing doctrine, see infra pts. I &
II.
14. See, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-97 (1987);
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223-24, 229 (1845).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Nye County, Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Opposition Memorandum"), and
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
("Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum").
16. The federal government owns a substantial percentage of lands in each of the 12
western states: 88% in Alaska; 85% in Nevada; 65% in Idaho; 63% in Utah; 52% in Oregon;
49% in Wyoming; 46% in California; 44% in Arizona; 36% in Colorado; 33% in New Mexico;
29% in Montana; and 28% in Washington. See GEORGE C. COGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 13 (2d ed. 1989); see also Cowart & Fairfax,
supra note 11, at 447 n.394 (citing COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra, for the proposition that a
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the federal government." All told, the federal government owns about
700 million acres of public land in just these twelve western states. '
In the other 38 states combined, the federal government owns only 4.4%
of the public land, though it owns 32.6% of all land in the country."
In Nye County, Nevada, for example, the federal government owns
93%-or 18,000 square miles-of the land within the county borders."
Equal footing-in meaning and in fact-is a concept that has been
argued about for over two centuries.2 ' As Justice Brennan wrote, the
questions regarding application of the doctrine are "substantial and
difficult ones."'2 2 Part I of this Article briefly examines the existence of
this constitutional doctrine, including its historical origins and its
continued recognition by both the courts and society. Part II analyzes
the intended force of the equal footing doctrine in relation to lands, state
sovereignty, and the Property Clause, as defined in the first century of
the United States.
Part III discusses the evolution in interpretation and application of
the equal footing doctrine in the country's second century. These
changes largely can be traced to flawed judicial analysis of the Property
Clause, restrictive notions of state sovereignty, and changing societal
expectations about lands and the role of the federal government.
Part IV addresses the new focus, at the start of the United States'
third century, on the issues of federalism, equal footing, and jurisdiction
over public lands. First, the obvious question: Given the fact of longstanding federal retention of vast amounts of land within the boundaries
of the "new" western states, does the equal footing doctrine today
demand that title to these public lands be passed to the states or to
private parties within the states? Ambiguity within the doctrine-exacerbated by the facts of State rejection of earlier federal offers
to sell the lands and State acquiescence to federal retention of the
lands-suggests that such a drastic remedy is not mandated.

significant percentage of land in 12 western states is held by the federal government).
17. ELIZABETH D. JUNKIN, LANDS OF BRIGHTER DESTINY 7 (1986).
18. See BERNARD SHANKS, THIS LAND Is YOUR LAND-THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE

AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 7 (1984); Note, The Property Power,supra note 11, at 820-21 n.27.
19. See Note, The PropertyPower, supra note 11, at 817 n.1. Federal ownership of public
lands in the older States is far less substantial than in the western states: 9.9% in Michigan;
6.7% in Minnesota; 4.9% in Missouri; 3.6% in Oklahoma; 1.4% in Ohio; and 0.6% in Iowa. See
COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 13.
20. Vincent J. Schodolski, Range Wars, S.F. EXAMINER, May 21, 1995, at A6.
21. Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt has described the equal footing controversy as
"'a kind of Kabuki drama we Westerners go through from time to time.' " Jeff Arnold,
Counties Take Lead as Sagebrush Rebellion Rides Again, COUNTY NEWS, Apr. 4, 1994, at 5.
22. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 80 S. Ct. 33, 38 (1959) (Brennan, J.).
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The real issue, then, is less a question of ownership of land and
resources and more a question of control over them. What kind of
sharing of power, or federalism, does the United States Constitution
require in the public lands in the West? And what kind of federalism
does our constitutional system permit; what sound and practical
approaches on the ground would be consistent with the Constitution?
As the focus of the Supreme Court and the country shifts back to the
role of the States as dual sovereigns in our federal system, it is time to
recognize anew the meaning and usefulness of the equal footing doctrine
in the context of land resources. The 1994-95 term of the Supreme
Court witnessed a resurgence of federalism and state sovereignty
concerns." A notion of reinvigorating federalism has taken center stage
in Congress, and in state capitals as well. Certainly there is a clear,
originalist basis for the Court's inclination to limit the reach of federal
power in areas of traditional state sovereignty, and for Congress'
propulsion toward returning large areas of governance to the states:
namely, the framers of our Constitution expected that broad powers
were reserved by and would be exercised by the states. In particular,
there is a basis both in original intent and in tradition for a unique and
important role of the states in governance of the public lands and
resources.
Absent explicit cession of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
government, both the equal footing doctrine and sensible public policy
demand that the states, in the West as elsewhere, have at least shared
governmental authority over the lands within their borders. There is a
formalistic, or plain meaning, basis in both original intent and tradition
for cooperative federalism in the public lands in the West. There is also
a functional basis; working solutions can be devised by giving a broad
or flexible reading of provisions so as to take account of present values
in federalism and in the long-term protection of the environment and

23. The New York Times declared that in its 1994-95 term, "the Court, for the first time
in half a century, is engaging in a debate over power: where power resides in the Federal system
and how the Constitution's grant of powers to the national Government is to be interpreted."
Linda Greenhouse, Blowing the Dust Off the ConstitutionThat Was, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995,
at 4-I. The case of United States v. Lopez, the Times reported, "was the first time in 60 years
that the Court had invalidated a Federal law on the ground that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce." Linda Greenhouse, Gavel Rousers:
Farewell to the Old Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at 4-4 (citing United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)). In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the New York
Times noted, four dissenters "argued for a vision of federalism in which the Federal Government
operates essentially at the sufferance of the sovereign states." Id. (referring to United States
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995)). The New York Times article concluded
that "[a] deep skepticism about Federal power was a theme that ran through the term." Id.
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public resources. Congress and the States have always realized such a
shared role in the context of public lands, albeit informally.
Today, given the wide expanse of the land and the paucity of federal
resources and agents on site, it is all the more necessary for the states
to share jurisdiction. New acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of the
dual sovereignty exercised over the public lands can impose an effective
framework for more formal federal and state cooperative federalism in
the management and protection of our lands.
I. THE EQUAL FOOTING DoCTRINE
Equal footing is considered a "constitutional" doctrine, though the
term is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. In fact, the doctrine
was established even before the time, of the Constitution. 4 The
Northwest Ordinance, enacted by the Continental Congress in July of
1787, formally decreed the equality of all states.' Out of lands
relinquished by seven of the original thirteen states, the Ordinance
authorized the Congress to create between three and five new states, to
be admitted "on an equal footing with the original States in all respects
' When the Northwest Ordinance was incorporated into an
whatever."26
act by the First Congress in 1789, the equal footing doctrine was
accepted under the Constitution.27 All newly created states have been
admitted to the United States as equals to every other state, including
the original thirteen." The admitting acts for the first two new states,
Vermont and Kentucky, declared each "a new and entire member of the

24. The equal footing doctrine first appeared in a Continental Congress resolution in 1780.
See JAY A. BARRETr, EVOLUTION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 Wrm AN AccouNT OF Tm
EARLIER PLANS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 20-21 (1891), cited in
Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 443 n.366.
25. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. V, reprinted in 1 PHILIP B. KuRLAND & RALPH
LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 27-29 (1987).
26. Id.; see also Pollard,44 U.S. at 222 (quoting Northwest Ordinance of 1787). The
Ordinance reflected the intent of the donor states that all states, original and future, be equal.
Virginia, for example, ceded to the United States the lands outside her boundaries on the
condition that the states formed from the territory " 'shall be republican states and admitted
members of the federal union, having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other states.' " Id. (quoting Virginia authorization statute); see also MERRILL
JANSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 235 (1940).
27. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 289 & n.232 (1992); see also Cowart
& Fairfax, supra note 11, at 443 n.366 (stating that the equal footing doctrine was initially
passed by a resolution of the Confederated Congress in 1780, thus predating the Constitution).
28. See Laycock, supra note 27, at 289 & n.233; see also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559,
566-67 (1911), discussed infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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United States of America." 9 Admitting acts for all new states since the
third, Tennessee, have provided that the states are admitted "[as] one of
the United States of America," "on an equal footing with the original
states in all respects whatsoever."3
The equal footing doctrine is also implied by Article IV, Section 3,
Clause 1 of the Constitution:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed
by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress.31
Every new "State" is a state, in the same sense as any original state.32
Because the equal footing doctrine is not expressly written in the
Constitution, however, some commentators do not recognize the doctrine
as "constitutional."33 The distinction generally is employed to strengthen arguments against application-or at least for limitation--of the
doctrine. 34 The fact that an express equal footing provision was not
incorporated in the Constitution, but rather was rejected by the
Constitutional Convention, can lead to a negative inference that the
framers did not intend to guarantee such equality to all states. 5
However, this inference is reasonably refuted by the framers' awareness
of the express requirement for equal footing in the 1787 Northwest
Ordinance, 36 by the express inclusion in every state admitting act of a
promise of equal footing,37 and by the understanding of the courts (and

29. See supra note 28.
30. See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567.
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.

32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Gaetke, supra note 11, at 633-35 & n.127.
34. See id.

35. The Constitutional Convention voted against including express "equal footing"
language in the Constitution. See id. at 634 n.127. A few participants worried that there might
arise an occasion where it would make sense not to ensure equal footing. Id. The fact that the
Convention voted against the language, however, does not preclude a court from upholding the
authority. For example, in the early Supreme Court case M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4

Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Court upheld the power of the federal government to establish a
corporation (a national bank), despite the fact that the framers had voted against creating federal
power to establish a corporation.
36. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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society) through the 19th and 20th centuries that equal footing was and
is a guarantee to each and every state.3"
The Supreme Court has always recognized such a guarantee.39 As
the Supreme Court held in Coyle v. Smith4 in 1911, " 'This Union'
was and is a union of states, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution itself."' The Court concluded that
"the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious
operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized."'42
Most scholars who point to the rejection of an equal footing doctrine
in the Constitution nonetheless will admit that "the Constitution includes
an equal footing concept."'43 They argue that the meaning of equal
footing, however, should be restricted "only to political equality, not
proprietary equality," on the basis that the doctrine was not expressly
included in the Constitution.' This argument fails, too. Once the critics
have agreed that the early Americans intended to provide for-and
understood that they had provided for--"equal footing" of the states,
then there is no reason to impose arbitrary limitations on the intended
meaning of the doctrine. Rather, we are returned to the original point of
inquiry: What does equal footing of the states mean?

38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 195-96; United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987); California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v.
United States, 457 U.S. 273, 281 n.9 (1982); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551
(1981); Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370 (1977); Alabama v. Texas,
347 U.S. 272, 274-75 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 71521 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29-31 (1947); Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567, 57273; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26, 30 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
434 (1892); Knight v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Weber v. Board of State
Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
423, 436 (1867); Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845); Pollard,44
U.S. at 223-24, 229. The definition of "equal footing" has varied, however.
40. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
41. Id. at 567. In Coyle, the Supreme Court held that the State of Oklahoma had a right
to move its capital immediately, despite a provision in its Enabling Act that required the State
to wait to move its capital until 1913. Id. at 562-64, 580.
42. Id. at 580.
43. See, e.g., Gaetke, supra note 11, at 634 n.127; see also Tom C. Clark, National
Sovereignty and Dominion Over Lands Underlyingthe Ocean, 27 TEX. L. REV. 140, 150 (194-8)
(stating that powers reserved to the states under the Constitution have been granted to
subsequently admitted states under the "equal footing" clause); Robert E. Hardwicke et al., The
Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEx. L. REv. 398, 424 n.83, 427 n.88 (1948)
(discussing equal footing in connection with federal restrictions on the use of state lands).
44. See Clark, supra note 43, at 150; Gaetke, supra note 11, at 634 n.127; Hardwicke et
al., supra note 43, at 424 n.83.
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Though the nature of the states as equal entities has been a bedrock
principle in American society, 5 the meaning of this "equality" has
been the subject of much debate. 46 The interpretation chosen has
serious implications for the very structure of government. Perhaps it is
not surprising that desire for a certain structure of government in turn
has affected the interpretation of the equal footing doctrine.
II. EQUAL FOOTING IN THE FIRST CENTURY
A. The FundamentalImportance of Lands
Justice O'Connor wrote in New York v. United States47 that "[s]ome
truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they are easily overlooked. 4 ' Today, the importance of land is such a truth. In the first
century of America's history, however, land was recognized as the
cornerstone of development and governance, and this recognition shaped
the meaning of property law in the early years under the Constitution.
The United States almost did not come into being because of bitter
conflicts over land.4 9 Seven of the original thirteen colonies held claim
to public lands that lay to the west, outside their borders.5" Maryland,
a state holding no such land, refused to consent to the Articles of
Confederation until Virginia agreed to cede its western public lands to
the federal government for the purpose of creating new and equal
states.51 The states without excess land feared that the large, land-rich
states would control the new Union, imposing their will on the smaller
states.52 To solve the stalemate and facilitate creation of the federal
government, the states holding public lands voluntarily ceded these

45. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
47. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
48. Id. at 2434.
49. Ironically, the United States also came to exist in part because of a public lands crisis.
The Declaration of Independence lists as one of the colonies' grievances the fact that the English
Crown "has endeavored to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose, obstructing
the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations
hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands." Brodie, supra note I1,at 695
n.4. A cause for the great concern was the Proclamation of 1763, by which the monarch had
confiscated public lands for the Crown's benefit. Id. at 695.
50. The colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia held title to territory to the west of the Appalachian Mountains,
which they had received by grant from the English Crown or by treaty with Indian tribes. See
THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59-60 (1884). The colonies of Maryland, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New Hampshire held no such lands. Id.
51. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 50 (1968).
52. See 3 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1744-1788, at 281-83 (1823).
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western lands to the Confederation, for the express purpose of formation
into new, independent, and equal states. 3
Such was the direction of thinking about lands at the time of the
Constitution: lands were not to be retained by the federal government,
but were to be formed into states.5 4 Other than the lands ceded by the
original states to the United States for this express purpose, the federal
government owned no significant amount of land within the first thirteen
states.5 Nor did the United States withhold any lands from the three
states next admitted. While the unappropriated public lands in the
newly-formed state of Tennessee were initially owned both by the State
and the United States, in 1846 Congress formally granted the lands to
the State. 6 Until the time of admission of the western states, the
federal government "disposed" of lands in new states by passing title to
the State or to individuals.5 7
That the unappropriated lands in each new state, as in each existing
state, would ultimately be placed in private hands was generally
understood throughout most of the country's first century.58 "Disposal"--meaning organization and transfer-of the unappropriated lands
53. New York began the process when it ceded its western lands to the Confederation.
Brodie, supra note 11, at 695. Virginia ceded its western lands in 1784. Id. By 1787, five of the
seven states had ceded part of their territory. Id. at 696. Just after the ratification of the
Constitution, the cessions of the final two states (North Carolina and Georgia) were accepted by
the federal government. Id.
54. See id. at 695.
55. MARION CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED 185 (1983). Even the lands ceded
by the original colonies were outside their real boundaries; they were only the unsettled,
unappropriated lands of the new West. See GATES, supra note 51, at 50-51.
The federal government has since acquired certain lands within the original thirteen states, for
such purposes as national parks and wildlife preserves. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C § 459e (1994) (Fire
Island National Seashore, in New York); 16 U.S.C. § 459f (1994) (Assateague Island National
Seashore, in Maryland and Virginia); and 16 U.S.C. § 459g (1994) (Cape Lookout National
Seashore, in North Carolina); see also Gaetke, supra note 11, at 637 n.134, 644 n.178. Although
these lands have been described as "article IV lands," see id. at 644 n.178, there is no such
delineation in the acquisition statutes. In fact, the statutory requirements that the lands "be
acquired only with the concurrence of [the owner state]," or only by state donation, are more
reminiscent of the Enclave Clause restrictions on acquisition. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 459e-l(a), 459fl(a), and 459g-l(a).
56. See GATES, supra note 51, at 286-88. The three states were Vermont, Kentucky, and
Tennessee. See id.*
57. See Brodie, supra note 11, at 703 (stating that Congress "subsequently surrendered the
overwhelming majority of the public lands in all the states east of the 100th meridian, reserving
control over vast tracts only in the western states"). Because they had been independent
countries, Texas retained its public lands upon admission as a state, and Hawaii had no
"unalienated public domain." See CLAWSON, supra note 55, at 186.
58. See James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 241, 247-49 (1994).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

into new states was the intended goal of the federal government, for it
was thought necessary to satisfy two important objectives: to raise
federal revenue, and to provide for orderly settlement of the lands in
each state. 9 In fact, pursuant to a 1785 ordinance, the Board of
Treasury, later the Treasury Department, was in charge of administering
the public lands, for "the public domain was regarded at this time
wholly from the point of view of revenue."' From the Land Ordinance
of 1785 to the Homestead Act of 1862, through to the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act of 1916, the United States set about disposing of lands,
passing title to private parties." As the Supreme Court noted in 1947,
the interest of the settlers was in "lands upon which to live, and waters
upon which to fish and sail."'62
Retention of lands by the federal government was not an issue in the
country's first century because for most of that period the United States
simply did not seek to retain the lands. 63 Even when the federal

59. See THE PUBLIC LANDS-STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN at xviixviii (Vernon R. Carstensen ed., 1968); GATES, supra note 51, at 61-63. Federal retention of
lands also was implausible, however, both because it was exactly the policy that the colonies
had fought against with the English Crown, and because the early Congress simply did not
envision the federal government as proprietor of such enormous tracts of land. See Huffman,
supra note 58, at 247-48.
60. AMELIA C. FORD, COLONIAL PRECEDENTS OF NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM 91-92
(Porcupine Press, 1976) (1910) (citing JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, X, at 118-23). The lands
became the responsibility of the Department of the Interior after its establishment in 1849. An
audit in 1880, however, revealed that land sales from the public domain had actually cost the
United States government $121 million more than the revenue the disposal of lands had
generated. See THE PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 59, at xviii.
61. Pursuant to the Land Ordinance of 1785, the United States was responsible for
extinguishing any Indian title to the land, surveying the land, offering the land at auction, and
granting title to the land by deed. See THE PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 59, at xvii-xviii; Huffman,
supra note 59, at 241, 248-49 & n.37. Later federal disposal acts which transferred land to
private parties included the Preemption Act of 1841, which pardoned squatters for their illegal
settlement of public lands and granted them title, see SHANKS, supra note 18, at 39; the
Homestead Act of 1862, which granted a party title to 160 acres for the cost of a filing fee and
five years of residence on the land, THE PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 59, at xviii; Huffman, supra
note 59, at 248 & n.39; the Timber and Stone Act of 1878, under which the United States sold
private parties up to 160 acres of valuable timber and stone lands surveyed in California,
Oregon, and Washington for $2.50 an acre, THE PUBLIC LANDS, supranote 59, at xxv; Huffman,
supra note 59, at 249 & n.43; the Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, which allowed parties to
homestead 320 acres, THE PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 59, at 481; Huffman, supra note 59, at
249 & n.46; the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, which allowed claims for 640 acres of
livestock grazing land, THE PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 59, at 481; SHANKS, supra note 18, at
47; Huffman, supra note 59, at 249 & n.48.
62. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 32 (1947).
63. In addition to public lands within the states, the United States also acquired and held
"territories" outside of and non-contiguous to the states that were not incorporated into the
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government began retaining some lands in the late 1800s and early
1900s, the United States "reserved" or "withdrew" these lands from the
general "disposal" of the public domain.' Thus, the United States
made clear thht such retention was an exception to the general policy of
disposal. Such reservations and withdrawals marked the dawn of a new
federal policy toward land conservation and management of retained
land holdings.
This change in policy was backed by a fortuitous lack of interest.
The first such major reservation was Yellowstone National Park in
1872.6' Despite the established understanding that-with limited,
enumerated exceptions-the federal government was not a land-holding
entity, the United States was able to "reserve" this land because it faced
no challenge no private owner was interested in the particular land at the
time. 66 Moreover, this first federal tract of land was carved out of what
were, at that time, territories, not states. 67 Thus, issues of equal footing
and sovereignty due states were not raised. 8 When the states of
Wyoming and Montana, whose territories bounded the Park, were
admitted to the United States, the Yellowstone land had already been
formed into a special federal entity. 69 The new states ceded "exclusive
control and jurisdiction" to70the United States over what was already
Yellowstone National Park.

United States, such as Puerto Rico. See JOHN E.

NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 6.3

(3d ed. 1986). These territories raise unique and interesting questions, both about federal
governmental authority and applicability of the Constitution. See id. These lands are not
included, however, in the general term "federal lands," as discussed in this Article.
64. The Forest Reserve Act of 1891, for example, authorized the President to "set apart
and reserve" lands covered with timber "as public reservations." Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
523, 536 (1911).
65. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-40 (1994); see also Huffman, supra note 59, at 250 & n.61.
Congress set aside Yellowstone as a" 'pleasuringground for the benefit and enjoyment of the
people.' " Goble, supra note 11, at 510 n.63.
66. See CLAWSON, supra note 55, at 134; see also MARION CLAWSON & BURNELL HELD,
THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT

22-35 (1957).

67. Yellowstone National Park is located in Wyoming and Montana, which did not
become states until 1890 and 1891, respectively. See Engdahl, supra note 11, at 318 n.158.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id. By federal act, the United States proclaimed the Park under the " 'sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.' "Id. (quoting Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, § 1, 28
Stat. 73). State cessions in admitting acts are not valid, however, if coerced by the United States
in contravention of the equal footing clause and the Constitution. See infra notes 71-85 and
accompanying text.
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B. State Authority to Disclaim Equal Footing
In the country's second century, the fact of state -"agreement" upon
admission to disclaim all rights to public lands was invoked as support
for the proposition that federal retention of such lands is valid, and not
contrary to the equal footing doctrine.7 Such an argument is illfounded, however. As the Supreme Court held in Pollard v. Hagan72
in 1845, any agreement between a state and the United States "cannot
operate as a contract between the parties."73 The agreement is "binding

as a law," but only as it reflects the powers already delineated in the
Constitution; it is only enforceable in so far as "all constitutional laws
are binding on the people, in the new states and the old ones."74

Thus, either (1) the states were not entitled to the unappropriated
lands and Congress was authorized to hold title in perpetuity without
violating the equal footing doctrine, with or without disclaimer, or (2)
such a disclaimer was not valid.75 This is the "plain deduction," the
Supreme Court held in Coyle
that when a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so
admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States, and that such
powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired or
shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipulations
embraced in the act under which the new State came into
the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if the
subject of congressional legislation after admission.76
As a result, even conditions deemed "irrevocable" in an admitting act
have no power and can be revoked if they are not otherwise required by
the Constitution.77 For "[w]hatever the limitation upon [a state's]

71. By their enabling acts, new states agreed to disclaim any ownership rights in the
unappropriated lands lying within the state, which were "reserved" to the United States. See,
e.g., Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 220-21.
72. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
73. For a discussion of this seminal equal footing case, see infra notes 91-109 and
accompanying text.
74. Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 224-25.
75. See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 573.
76. Id.
77. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the State of New
York could not be estopped from challenging the propriety of the federal government's attempt
to commandeer state action, even though New York purportedly accepted the commandeering
principle and originally had agreed to participate in disposal of low-level radioactive waste). The
State of Nevada will soon test this proposition in the public lands context; Senate Joint
Resolution 27 will allow state residents to vote in the November 1996 election on whether to
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powers as a government whilst in a territorial condition, whether from
the ordinance of 1787 or the legislation of Congress, it ceased to have
any operative force, except as voluntarily adopted by her after she
became a State of the Union."7' The Court noted in the 1882 case
Escanaba & Lake Michigan TransportationCo. v. City of Chicagothat
"[t]he language of the act of admission is 'on an equal footing with the
original states in all respects whatever.' Equality of constitutional right
and power
is the condition of all the states of the Union, old and
79
new."
The mere existence of a disclaimer, therefore, is'of no consequence
unless the parties possessed the authority to enter into such an agreement.8" A state's disclaimer in an admitting document of the state's
rights to public lands within its borders is only enforceable if that
disclaimer does not impact on the equal footing of the state.81 And
Congress can only act upon such a disclaimer legitimately if Congress
has the right, according to the Constitution, to exercise that disclaimed
power.82
In America's first century, land was essential for creation of a state,
and was integrally tied to the equal footing of the states. Hence, a state
would not and could not be forced to disclaim its ultimate power over
land. But the State could disclaim any interference with disposal of the
lands within the state, for the Property Clause gave Congress the right
to manage the disposal of unappropriated lands. 3
However, this right was limited. The United States was understood
to have the right only to temporarily manage the lands in the territories
and new states, looking toward the disposal of the lands to private

"revoke" its surrender of control over unappropriated lands by removing the disclaimer clause
from the Nevada Constitution. See Ed Vogel, Sagebrush Pioneer Thinks New Rebellion Too
Radical,LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 7, 1995, at 15A.
78. Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688 (1882).

79. Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
80. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court in 1900 found valid the Minnesota constitutional provision that "this State shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil within the

[Territory of Minnesota], by the United States, or with any regulations Congress may find
necessary for securing the title to said soil to bona fide purchasers thereof." Steams v.
Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244 (1900). Similarly, the State of Wisconsin was admitted into the
United States upon the condition "that the State would never interfere with the primary disposal
of the soil within it by the United States, nor with any regulations Congress might find necessary
for securing the title in such soil to bona fide purchasers." Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517,

523 (1877).
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parties.8 4 Once the lands were so disposed, they would then be subject
to the sovereignty of the state." The next two sections explore the dual
powers-state and federal-over land.
C. Land as an Element of State Sovereignty
The recognized importance of land to a state, and the early Congress'
complete certainty that, as with the original states, all lands in new
states would be disposed of to private parties, inevitably framed the
interpretation of equal footing. As early as 1818, the Court held that a
state's right to control the property within its own borders was an
essential part of its sovereignty as a state.86 Without its sovereignty, a
new state would not be an equal state.
In 1819, in the preeminent case on federalism, M'Culloch v. Maryland,87 the Court delineated the doctrine of enumerated powers: the
federal government exercised only the powers delegated to it in the
Constitution, and the states and the people reserved all powers not
enumerated or reasonably implied.8 There followed a notion of dual
sovereignty. In 1858, the Court explained that "the powers of the
general government, and of the state, although both exist and are
exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within
their respective spheres."89 Thus, any time a congressional act infringed

84. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
86. United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 386-87 (1818). In fact, this notion
that lands within a state's borders are integrally tied to the state's sovereignty is still recognized.
See Californiaex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 457 U.S. at 273. The Supreme Court held in 1982
that part of a state's sovereignty over lands within its boundaries included the right to determine
property disputes by state law unless an issue in the case depended on a principle of federal law
requiring the displacement of state law. See id. at 281 (determining that title to oceanfront land
created through accretion was held by the United States, because the land had not originally
qualified as land under navigable waters); see also Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313,
332-33 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that federal law governs the question of
ownership of once-submerged lands), overruled by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (holding that an ownership dispute concerning lands
underlying navigable river was governed by Oregon law, not by federal common law).
87. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
88. Id. at 384-88; see U.S. CONST. amend. X. Interestingly, the Court in M'Culloch also
reenforced the power of the federal government, giving a flexible and broad reading to the
federal economic power and its protection from the states. See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 385-99.
89. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858), quoted in LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 381 n.16 (2d ed. 1988).
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upon a state's sovereignty, then Congress exceeded its power granted by
the Constitution."
In the seminal case of Pollardv. Hagan,9 the Supreme Court was
"[for]the first time... called upon to draw the line that separates the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the government of the union, and the
state governments," over the ownership of and jurisdiction over land.92
The doctrine of equal footing provided the basis for the Court's
decision.93
In Pollard, two parties claimed valid title to a tract of land.9 4 The
plaintiffs claimed title based on a federal patent; the defendants claimed
contrary title based on a deed from the State.95 The Court held that the
land was the property of the state, not the federal government, so that
only the State had the authority to grant the land.9 6 Thus, the Court
validated the title of the defendants.97
Moreover, the Court held that a state's control over lands within its
borders directly implicated the equal footing doctrine, for "[w]hen
Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the
original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed."98 To the Court in
1845, this meant power over land. The Court noted that "the only cases,
within the United States, in which all the powers of government are
united in a single government" over lands are: (1) in the case of lands
expressly covered by the Enclave Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16
(i.e., in the seat of government and in lands purchased by the federal
government for the erection of "needful buildings"), and (2) in the case
of lands where there is only a "temporary territorial government" (i.e.,
Article IV lands).99 Thus, held the Court,

90. TRIBE, supra note 89, § 5-20.
91. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
92. Id. at 220. Those who advocate a very narrow reading of the equal footing doctrine
argue that Pollard more specifically dealt with the issue of sovereignty over lands covered by
water. See, e.g., Gaetke, supra note 11, at 641; Goble, supra note 11, at 502-04, 507. See infra
notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
93. Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230.
94. Id. at 219.
95. Id. at 219-20.
96. Id. at 230.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 223. The power of eminent domain was "[t]he right which belongs to... the
sovereign, of disposing.., of all the wealth contained in the state." Id. This power, explained
the Court in Pollard,was "necessary to him who governs, and is, consequently, a part of the
empire, or sovereign power." Id.
99. Id. at 223-24.
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the United States hold the public lands within the new
states by force of the deeds of cession, and the statutes
connected with them, and not by any municipal sovereignty
which it may be supposed they possess, or have reserved by
compact with the new states, for that particular purpose.
The [Enclave Clause] shows that no such power can be
exercised by the United States within a state." °
The Pollard Court held that the federal government's exercise of a
power of municipal sovereignty over lands within a state would be
"repugnant to the Constitution.''.
For the right of Alabama and every other new state to
exercise all the powers of government, which belong to and
may be exercised by the original states of the union, must
be admitted, and remain unquestioned, except so far as they
are, temporarily, deprived of control over the public lands.
And whenever the United States shall have fully executed these [public lands] trusts, the municipal sovereignty of
the new states will be complete, throughout their respective
borders, and they, and the original states, will be upon an
equal footing, in all respects whatever."
The Court focused on land and on the powers of government enjoyed
by control over the land. 3
Some critics of the equal footing doctrine point out that Pollard
specifically addressed the issue of sovereignty over lands covered by
water, and not lands generally.0 4 Thus, they argue that the language
in the Court's opinion regarding all lands can be dismissed as dicta. 5
However, to argue that the language is dicta is to assume one's
100. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis added). New states, wrote the Court, succeeded to all rights of the
original states, "except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the
possession ... of the United States ...for the temporary purposes provided for" in order for
the federal government to create the state. Id. at 223.
103. Id. at 221-24.
104. See supra note 91.
105. See, e.g., Gaetke, supra note 11, at 641 (stating that "[h]aving concluded that the
submerged lands were not federal property, the Court's further assertion that article IV provides
no grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal property within a state is relegated to mere
dictum"); Goble, supra note 11, at 502-04 (stating that "[tihe Court had previously decided that
the original thirteen states held title to lands beneath navigable waters within their boundaries
as an incident of sovereignty and therefore concluded" that Alabama succeeded to the same
rights).
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conclusion: that the Court distinguished between jurisdiction over
navigable lands and all other lands. But it is the very generality of the
Court's chosen language and analysis that indicates that the Court did
not view the power over submerged lands as different from the power
over other lands held temporarily by the federal government."° None
of these lands were "federal property," property subject to the United
States' exclusive jurisdiction.'" The Court stated quite clearly that
"[w]e think a proper examination of this subject will show, that the
UnitedStates never held any municipalsovereignty,jurisdiction,or right
of soil in and to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new
states were formed; except for temporary purposes.. . ."'0' In no way
did the Court indicate that its decision about state jurisdiction over
property was one to be limited to a certain type of land, under navigable
waters or elsewhere.' 9
Nor did any other Supreme Court decision, until the mid-1900s,
suggest that there existed such a distinction between the equal footing
right of a state to power over all lands within its borders, as opposed to
only over lands under navigable waters."0 Practically speaking, at a
time of mass settlement and development of the country, an argument
that the federal government could retain tide and sovereignty over all
lands other than those under navigable waters would have been
derided."' Given this reality, and the prevailing views of the broad
powers of the State and the limited power of the federal government, no
such distinction made sense.

106. The Court did view the derivation of the "right over rivers" as distinguishable from
that of the right over lands, for "[r]ivers must be kept open; they are not land, which may be
sold." Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 216. Thus, the Court explained, it did not matter if the rights
over a river were not passed at the time the territory was acquired, for "[s]overeignty transferred
itself, and when this passes, the right over rivers passes too." Id. The Court did not view this
distinction as relevant to the question of jurisdiction over property generally, however. See id.
The Court concluded thereafter that "as it is, the United States have nothing in Alabama but
proprietary rights. They cannot put their foot in a state to claim jurisdiction without its consent."
Id.
107. See id. at 221.
108. Id.

109. In fact, Justice Catron, in a spirited dissent, argued against the majority's decision
because he believed it involved "principles, in my judgment, as applicable to the high lands of
the United States as to the low lands and shores." Id. at 235 (Catron, J., dissenting).
110. For a discussion of the limited application of the equal footing doctrine in the mid1900s, see infra pt. III.
111. See Brodie, supra note 11, at 714 (stating that "[t]his conjures up the historical
possibility of the Congress instituting and creating riverine or canal states, with the overwhelming majority of the states' land being reserved in the federal government").
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D. FederalPower and the Property Clause
As discussed earlier, the United States was not intended by the
framers to be a landed power, nor was it treated as such for most of the
1800s." 2 Initial cession of the original states' lands to the federal
government, and later acquisition of lands by the United States through
purchase and treaty, raised questions about federal power over lands.
Notions of federal power evolved over time, and on sometimes dubious
grounds.
The United States did not explicitly have the power to own lands
under the Constitution, except by consent of a particular state's
legislature for certain express purposes, as provided not in Article IV,
but in an entirely separate provision, Article . 1 Under Article IV the
United States had the authority to form and admit new states, and to
"dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.""..4 However, as president, Thomas Jefferson struggled with the limits of federal
authority provided by these Article IV clauses because he found no
authority for the United States to purchase lands." 5 In a functionalist

112. See supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
113. The Enclave Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, provides the federal government
with the authority:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States,
and to exercise like Authority over all places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful Buildings.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
114. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The power to admit new states is expressed in U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. The power to dispose of and regulate property is encompassed by the
Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
115. See Merrill D. Peterson, ConstitutionalHistory 1801-29, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 394 (L. Levy ed., 1986). As early as 1788, The Federalistreported
that, appreciating the potential value of the western territory, Congress " 'assumed the
administration of this [national] stock,' "."'beg[a]n to make it productive,' " and " 'proceeded
to form new states; to erect temporary governments ...; and to prescribe the conditions, on
which such states shall be admitted into the confederacy.' " 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1311 (1833). The Federalistnoted that " '[a]ll
this has been done, and done without the least colour of constitutionalauthority. Yet no blame
has been whispered, and no alarm has been sounded.' "Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST Nos. 38,
42, 43). Some 100 years later, the Supreme Court held that certain rights of authority were
inherent to a sovereign nation. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
318 (1936). In Curtiss-Wright,the Court expounded upon a theory of a dual source of federal
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decision, Jefferson ultimately permitted the federal government to do so
' Nonetheless, he acknowledged that the United States'
anyway. 16
purchase of the Louisiana Territory without passage of a constitutional
amendment made the Constitution "a blank paper by construction.""' 7
The federal government's growing assertions of power to hold and
manage lands largely paralleled Supreme Court interpretations of the
Article IV Property Clause at the given time. To the extent that the
United States acted pursuant to the Property Clause, this assertion of
power to hold and manage the lands became acceptable to the Court. As
118 "Congress
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in United States v. Fisher,
must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any
means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted
by the constitution.11 9
But the power granted by the Constitution is unclear. The Property
Clause, remember, was defined in the Constitution as providing
Congress with the "[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." 20 It is significant that the clause appears in Article
IV of the Constitution. All the provisions of Article IV relate to the
creation, respective powers, and protection of the states and their
citizens. Section 1 guarantees "Full Faith and Credit" to each state's
acts, records, and judicial proceedings; section 2 guarantees each state's
citizens "all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens" and provides for
criminal reciprocity; section 3, clause 1 provides that "New States may
be admitted by the Congress into this Union," and protects the jurisdiction and geographic bounds of every state; and section 4 "guarantee[s]
to every State ... a Republican Form of Government," protection

authority: (1) grants of power in the Constitution; and (2) external sovereignty power that is
inherent and inherited. See id. at 318-20 (stating that "the investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality.").
116. See supra note 115.
117. See id.
118. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358 (1805).
119. Id. at 396. Federal acts that were reasonably related to powers enumerated in the
Constitution were therefore valid: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. IV.
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"against Invasion," and protection when requested "against domestic
Violence." '2 2 Contained as it is within this Article, it is reasonable to
view the Property Clause also as related to the states.
It also is important to note that the first power of the Property Clause
is the power "to dispose."' Such a specific and narrow directive
would be most unusual if one were talking about a delegation of a
sovereign, or legislative, power. 2 4 Rather, this chosen beginning is
evidence of the limited authority of the United States over these lands.
Further evidence is the notion of "needful [r]ules," whereby the federal
government seems to be granted a capacity to make only practical,
useful provisions, not a sovereign capacity to govern."z The language
of Article I provides another interesting contrast; unlike the limited grant
of power specified in the Property Clause, in the Enclave Clause, the
United States is specifically given authority to "exercise exclusive
[1]egislation" in Washington, D.C., and in certain defined federal
properties.126

The limited purposes of the Property Clause were undisputed until
the 1900s. 27 In the country's first century, the courts held that the
Property Clause provided the federal government with the power to
temporarily manage lands in territories pending creation of a state, and
the power to dispose of lands in those new states." Recall that in
Pollardthe Supreme Court held that "the United States never held any
municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the
territory, of which.,. any of the new states were formed; except for
temporary purposes.'129 Rather, the United States was "invest[ed] ...
with the eminent domain of the country ceded, both national and
municipal, for the purposes of temporary government, and to hold it in
trust" for creation of a state and for disposal of the lands therein."3
The Court held that "as soon as these purposes ['to convert the land into
money for the payment of the debt, and to erect new states over the

122. Id.
123. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
124. Compare this power with, for example, the Enclave Clause in Article I. See supra note
113.
125. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
126. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
127. In the 1900s, the United States sought legitimacy for its assertion of a power to keep
public lands and resources. See infra pt. III.
128. See Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 222. The Court noted that the lands ceded "should be considered as a common
fund for the use and benefit of all the United States, to be faithfully and bona fide disposed of
for that purpose." Id. at 221.
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territory thus ceded"] could be accomplished, the power of the
United States over these lands, as property, was to cease."'3
Contemporary cases in the 1800s were consistent with the Pollard
limited view of federal power. The 1840 Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Gratiot33 affirmed the power of the federal government to dispose of territorial lands."3 But the Court in Gratiot focused
on the issue of land disposal within a territory-not within a
state-when it declared that "this [property] power is vested in Congress
without limitation; and has been considered the foundation upon which
the territorial governments rest.' ' 35 No mention was made by the Court
of stripping the sovereign powers of a state over land within its borders.
Rather, the Court noted that the law disputed in Gratiot, which
indefinitely authorized the President to lease lead mines, "was passed
before Illinois was organized as a state; and she cannot now complain
of any disposition
or regulation of the lead mines previously made by
136
Congress."'
Not addressing the nature of the federal government's reservation in
Gratiot,the Court only distinguished the property at issue from public
lands generally: "It has been the policy of the government, at all times
in disposing of the public lands, to reserve the mines for the use of the
United States."'137 After Gratiot, in the 1853 case Hicks v. Bell,3 8 the
California Supreme Court considered the specific issue of the federal
government's reservation of mineral resources, and held that the United
States' power over such resources is temporary, and merely that of a
proprietor. 39 The most telling limitation on the meaning of Gratiot
came from the Supreme Court itself five years later, when the Court in
Pollarddid not even mention Gratiot, holding that federal holdings of
property within a state under Article IV are only temporary."
Ten years after Pollard,the Supreme Court revisited the meaning of
the Property Clause, this time in a most controversial context: slavery.' 4 ' Once again, to the moral outrage of many at the time, and

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 224.
Id.
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.

137. Id.
138. 3 Cal. 219 (1853).
139. Id. at 227; Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 442-43.
140. See Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 212.
141. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). -The Supreme Court case
is well-known, and justifiably reviled, as the decision that relegated African-Americans to a
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certainly today, the Court held that the power of the federal government
over property was a paltry one. 42 In a 7-2 decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,14' each Justice separately authored his own opinion, and the
Court held that the United States had no power to enact the Missouri
Compromise and strip an "owner" of his right to his "property"-in this
44
case, to an individual who had the status of slave in a southern state.
Interpretation of federal power, pursuant to the Property Clause45 and the
Constitution generally, was the focus of the Court's analysis.
For our purposes, what is important about the Dred Scott decision is
that, whatever intense disagreements the Justices had about the
celebrated issues, all of the Justices-those in the majority and
minority-agreed on one proposition: the Constitution allowed the
federal government to manage the territories only on a temporary
basis."4 That view reflected the first century position of the Supreme
Court.47

The Justices disagreed about whether the Property Clause was
applicable to territories that were not held, or anticipated to be held, by
the United States at the time of the Constitution.' 4 The majority, who
permanent position of inferiority outside the political community of the United States. Although
one may be repulsed by the decision, one should not simply dismiss the opinions of the Court,
particularly where they shed useful light on important issues that were entangled with the slavery
question.
142. See id.
143. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
144. See id. at 452.
145. See id. at 432-54.
146. See id. at 446, 544-46 & 606-10.
147. See supra pt. II.
148. In the Opinion of the Court, written by Chief Justice Taney, the Court held that the
entire Property Clause
has no bearing on the present controversy, and the power there given, whatever it
may be, is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory which at that
time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States .... and can have no
influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a foreign Government. It was
a special provision for a known and particular territory, and to meet a present
emergency, and nothing more.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432 (Taney, C.J.). The limited power, wrote the Chief Justice,
was necessary to allow the federal government to pay the war debt by sale of property and to
maintain the unappropriated lands and to protect the people in ceded territories. Id. at 435-36,
441-42.
The two dissenters disagreed with this limitation of the Property Clause to the property held
(or anticipated) by the United States at the time of the Constitution. Id. at 546 (McLean, J.,
dissenting); id. at 613-14 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Justice McLean argued for expediency, for
"[w]ithout temporary Governments, our public lands could not have been sold, nor our
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believed that the application of the Property Clause was limited to the
original territories, nonetheless agreed that the United States had the
power to govern a new territory," '[p]erhaps ... result[ing], necessarily, from the facts that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular
State, and is within the power and jurisdiction of the United
States.' "9 However, the Justices disagreed about the extent of the
federal government's power over the territory. The majority argued that
as to these new lands, the federal government did not have the specific
grant of temporary governing power found in the Property Clause."
Thus, protection of "all" private property rights was required within a
new territory, because the federal government did not have the power
to arbitrarily favor one state's citizen over another's by choosing a
definition of "property." '' Instead, the dissenters argued that by failing
wildernesses reduced to cultivation, and the population protected; nor could our flourishing
States, West and South, have been formed." Id. at 546 (McLean, J., dissenting). Therefore, he
favored "acquiescence under a settled construction of the Constitution for sixty years, though
it may be erroneous; which has secured to the country an advancement and prosperity beyond
the power of computation." Id. Based on the power of the federal government to make war and
make treaties, and an implied power to acquire foreign territory, Justice Curtis argued in his
dissent that the United States should be assumed to have "contemplated" any property that it
obtained. Id. at 613 (Curtis, J., dissenting). He
construe[d] this clause, therefore, as if it had read, Congress shall have power to
make all needful rules and regulations respecting those tracts of country, out of the
limits of the several States, which the United States have acquired, or may
hereafter acquire, by cessions, as well of the jurisdiction as of the soil.
Id. at 613-14.
149. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 442-43 (quoting American & Ocean Ins. Cos. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)). Because the majority believed that this power to
govern was not derived from an express provision in the Constitution, however, these Justices
looked to "the provisions and principles of the Constitution, and its distribution of powers." Id.
at 447. Focusing on the ultimate role of a territory, to be a "sovereign and independent" state,
the Court reasoned that the federal government, acting as a temporary surrogate, should only
impose "some form of civil authority [that] would be absolutely necessary to organize and
preserve civilized society, and prepare it to become a State." Id. at 447, 449.
150. See id. at 450-51.
151. See id. at 450 (stating that "the rights of property are united with the rights of person,
and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and [sic] property, without due process of law. And
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property,
merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United
States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law.").
Unlike a state, the Court held that Congress had no authority to prohibit a citizen from
holding a slave ("property") in certain territory; thus, the Act "is not warranted by the
Constitution, and is therefore void." Id. at 452. Six of the Justices agreed that the Missouri
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to respect one state's determination that a slave had been freed, the
Court favored the other state.'52
Whatever their disagreement about the source and the substantive
limits of the power of the United States over acquired lands, the Justices
in Dred Scott agreed that this power was limited to the lands and
property in a "territory," and did not extend to those in an admitted
state; the United States had power only regarding temporary governance
and sale of the lands.' 53 As Chief Justice Taney wrote, "no power is
given [to the federal government] to acquire a Territory to be held and
governed permanently in that character .... [The Territory] is acquired
to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by
Congress with absolute authority."'" In his dissent, Justice Curtis
declared that the power of the federal government to temporarily govern
the "settlers on the public lands" was "manifestly conferred to enable
the United States to dispose of its public lands to settlers, and to admit
them into the Union as States."' 55 This power, wrote Justice Curtis, is

Compromise (section eight of the Act of 1820) was unconstitutional. See id. at 455 (Wayne, J.,
concurring). The seventh member of the majority, Justice Nelson, expressed no opinion on the
issue. Id.
In the 1981 case Nevada ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166
(D.C. Nev. 1981), it appears that the Nevada district court misunderstood the significance of the
Dred Scott majority's limited view of the Property Clause. The Nevada court recognized that
Pollardestablished that there existed within the Property Clause a "trust (to sell the public
lands)." Id. at 171. But based on the Dred Scott holding that the Property Clause only applied
to the territories at the time of the Constitution, the Nevada court concluded that the federal
government's exercise of power in all later territories was not limited by any such requirement
that the lands be sold. See id. To the contrary, if the Property Clause does not apply to the
Nevada public lands, then, it would seem, the power of the federal government over Nevada's
territory is even more limited.
152. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 559 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice McLean
stated:
I am not able to reconcile this result with the respect due to the State of Illinois.
Having the same rights of sovereignty as the State of Missouri in adopting a
Constitution, I can perceive no reason why the institutions of Illinois should not
receive the same consideration as those of Missouri.
Id.
153. See id. at 446, 544-46 & 606-10.
154. Id. at 446-47.
155. Id. at 615 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Justice Curtis explained that at the time of the
Constitution,
the unsettled territory was viewed as justly applicable to the common benefit, so
far as it then had or might attain thereafter a pecuniary value; and so far as it might
become the seat of new States, to be admitted into the Union upon an equal footing
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"to govern the inhabitants of the territory, by such laws as Congress
deems needful, until they obtain admission as States. 15 6
Through the late 1800s, the Supreme Court continued to view the
power of the United States in the public lands as limited to temporary
governance pending distribution." In 1871, the Supreme Court held
in Gibson v. Chouteau,1 8 that "[w]ith respect to the public domain, the
Constitution vests in Congress the power of disposition and of making
all needful rules and regulations. That power is subject to no limitations."' 9 Though the language sounds very broad, the power described
as limitless is, in fact, very specific: "Congress has the absolute right to
prescribe the times, the conditions, and the mode of transferring this
property, or any part of it, and to designate the persons to whom the
transfer shall be made."'' It is this power to transfer land that the
Court held was protected from state legislation. 61 The Court explained
that it was "to prevent the possibility of any attempted interference with
[this power to transfer property, that] a provision has been usually
inserted in the compacts by which new States have been admitted into
the Union, that such interference with the primary disposal of the soil
of the United States shall never be made." 62
In the 1877 case of Beecher v. Wetherby, 63 as well, the Supreme
Court noted that "the words 'public lands' 'are habitually used in our
legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under
general laws.' "'a Thus, as in Gibson, the Court focused on the federal
government's right to sell or distribute the public lands. 6 In Beecher,
with the original States.
Id. at 606.
Again, the Nevada district court in Nev. State Bd. ofAgric. apparently misread the DredScott
decision. The Nevada court held that, under Dred Scott, the United States is not required to sell
the public lands in Nevada, because it was not an original territory. Nev. State Bd. ofAgric., 512
F. Supp. at 171. However, even the Dred Scott majority, who believed the Property Clause to
be inapplicable to all but original territories, agreed that the public lands in all territories were
to be sold. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
156. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 615 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
157. See infra notes 158-70 and accompanying text.
158. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1871).
159. Id. at 99.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
164. Id. at 520 (quoting Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761 (1875) (Davis, J.)).
165. See id. at 523. The Court looked to the state's promise that it "would never interfere
with the primary disposal of the soil within it by the United States, nor with any regulations
Congress might find necessary for securing the title in such soil to bona fide purchasers." Id.
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however, because the Court deemed the setting apart of lands as a
reservation to be a "specific appropriation" of those lands, the Court
held that the lands had been disposed of, such that "they have never
since become 'public lands.' "'"
Yet in another of the often cited equal footing decisions, the 1894
case of Shively v. Bowlby, 67 the Court again focused on settlement of
the public lands. 68 "[I]n disposing of the public lands," the Court
wrote, Congress "has constantly acted upon the theory that those
lands ... above high-water mark, may be taken up by actual occupants,
in order to encourage the settlement of the country ...
6 Settlement
was apparently the "disposal" thought of as the norm, as it had been
through the 1800s.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to validate an expansive view of
federal powers over public lands indicated a continued recognition that
the Constitution required protection of a state's sovereignty. Such
protection was required, under the equal footing doctrine and the states'
Tenth Amendment reservation of powers.'70
III.

FEDERALISM IN THE SECOND CENTURY

A. Land as an Object of FederalPower
The early 1900s saw an increase in the reservation of lands for
public use,' 7 ' and correspondingly, the Supreme Court's declarations
of the potential power of the federal government over lands became far
more broad.' By the turn of the century, the Supreme Court's view
of the powers of the federal government over land, under the Property
Clause, had subtly changed to permit the Congress to have on-going
control over all unappropriated lands within a new state's borders.'73

166. See id. at 520.
167. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
168. See id. at 49.
169. Id. Unlike the lands "above high-water mark," however, the Court held that the
"navigable waters and the soils under them, whether within or above the ebb and flow of the
tide, shall be and remain public highways." Id.
170. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, the last in the "Bill of Rights" adopted in
1791, provides that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
171. In addition to withdrawal of national parks, the act of March 3, 1891, for example,
authorized the President "to set apart and reserve, in any State or Territory, public lands, wholly
or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public
forest reservations." United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 507 (1910).
172. See infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
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Even so, Supreme Court cases continued to reflect an assumption that
actual use of the power of the federal government regarding the public
lands would be restrained, if not temporary. 4
The Court addressed the power of Congress over "federal" lands
within a new state in the 1897 case Camfield v. United States. 17 In
Camfield, the challenge to federal authority was not by the State of
Colorado, but by defendants who had erected a fence enclosing 20,000
acres of public lands for their exclusive use. 176 Their actions were
contrary to a federal act that declared unlawful " 'all enclosures of ay
public lands' " and " 'the assertion of a right to the exclusive use and
occupancy of any part of the public lands of the United States in any
State or any of the Territories of the United States.' "" The question
was whether the congressional act, itself, was constitutional.'78
The Court first noted that, "[w]hile the lands in question are all
within the State of Colorado, the [federal] Government has, with respect
to its own lands, the rights of an ordinary proprietor, to maintain its
possession and to prosecute trespassers.' ' 79 Thus, as would a private
landowner, the federal government had recourse against fence enclosure
by the laws against trespass and nuisance. 8 ' Congress' act was passed,
said the Court, because "the evil of permitting persons, who owned or
174. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
175. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
176. Id. at 521-22. The defendants claimed that they had placed swinging gates at the
section lines in the two townships enclosed "to afford access to so much of the public domain
as was inclosed by the aforesaid fence." Id. at 520. Furthermore, the defendants applied "an
ingenious [device]" to accomplish their purpose of enclosing the public lands: they erected
fences "immediately outside the even-numbered [public] sections, [such that] they are manifestly
intended to inclose the Government's lands, though, in fact, erected a few inches inside the
defendants' line." Id. at 525.
177. Id. at 521-22 (quoting "An Act to Prevent the Unlawful Occupancy of the Public
Lands" ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (1885)).
178. Id. at 522. The Court rejected the defendants' justification for their actions. Id. at 528.
The defendants had argued that the fences were necessary in order to build large reservoirs to
irrigate the lands in the vicinity; their work, they vowed, "was of great importance and utility,
and would redound to the great advantage of the United States and its citizens." Id. at 521. The
Court found this to be "immaterial." Id. at 528.
179. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 524. The Court's acceptance of the federal government as a
proprietor in no way contradicts the established view that Congress held the lands only
temporarily, pending "disposal," because the Court did not address the longevity of Congress'
"ownership" of the lands.
180. Id. at 524. The Court noted, for example, that some states also recognized a problem
with the common notion that "a man may build a fence upon his own land as high as he
pleases"; the legislature of Massachusetts, for one, had passed a statute in 1887 "declaring that
any fence 'unnecessarily exceeding six feet in height, maliciously erected or maintained for the
purpose of annoying the owners or occupants of adjoining property,' should be deemed a private
nuisance.... ." Id. at 523 (quoting an unspecified Massachusetts statute).
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controlled the alternate sections, to inclose the entire tract, and thus to
exclude or frighten off intending settlers, finally became so
great. . . ." ' The act outlawing this conduct largely proclaimed
(unnecessarily) the government's rights as a proprietor to protect the
lands. 82
'
The Court held that, in addition to its rights as a proprietor, Congress
also had the constitutional authority to pass this act to protect its
property. 3 This federal "power over its own property" decreed the
Court, was "analogous to the police power of the several
States.... ,84 The "power of legislating for the protection of the
public lands" was said to be necessary, because "[a] different rule would
place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of
state legislation."'8 5 Even so, the Court hastened to limit its affirmation
of power: "we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited
power to legislate against nuisances within a State, which it would have
within a Territory.... " 86 Nor did the Court deny the temporary status
of the federal government's powers over the lands, or the fact that the
lands ultimately were to be disposed of by the federal government. 7
8 in 1900, the Supreme Court maintained
In Steams v. Minnesota"'
its focus on distribution of the "federal" lands, noting that "the question
181. Id. at 524-25.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 528. The Court noted that the act provided Congress an extension to the recourse
normally due a proprietor, for it empowered the federal government to prohibit both fence
enclosures actually on its public lands and those that had the effect of enclosing the property.
Id. at 525. Thus, the fences erected by defendants on their property were covered by the act. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 526.
186. Id. at 525.
187. See id. at 525-26.
188. 179 U.S. 223 (1900) (holding that State agreement to accept percent of railroad gross
earnings, in lieu of normal property tax on lands granted to State of Minnesota as trustee or to
railroads for railroad construction, is valid, despite the State constitution's requirement that all
non-exempt lands be taxed on the basis of the cash value of the property). In this tax case, the
Court noted the fact that
[t]he system of providing for the payment of a percentage of the gross earnings of
the road in lieu of all other taxes on "railroad property" .. . was inaugurated by
the territorial legislatures, and was universally in vogue at the date of the adoption
of the constitution. And after that date the state legislatures invariably assumed that
they continued to possess the power to adopt this system of commuted taxation
when granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad, whether such lands
were the absolute property of the State, or were held by it in trust for that purpose
under an act of Congress.
Id. at 235 (quoting State ex reL Marr v. Luther, 56 Minn. 156, 162-64 (1894)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss4/3

30

Landever: Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and St
EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE AND THE NEW FEDERALISM

here is ... as to full [federal] control over the matter of sale and
disposal" of land in a new state."8 9 For authority, the Court looked to
the "reservation in the act of admission and the acceptance thereof by
the State of Minnesota"; by this state disclaimer, the "right of Congress
to determine the disposition of public lands within that State was reserved.... ."" As it had been through the 1800s, the issue still,
according to the Court, was "[w]hether Congress should sell or donate
[the lands within the state]; what terms it should impose upon the sale
or donation; what arrangements it should make for securing title to the
beneficiaries .... "'91
Federal retention of the vast lands was considered by the Court in
Steams, but only as an abstract, temporary possibility." Addressing
the state court's fears that "Congress might act so as in effect to keep
withdrawn a large area of the State from taxation," the Court noted that
"if Congress should determine that the great body of public lands within
the State of Minnesota should be reserved from sale for an indefinite
period it might do so, and thus the lands be exempted from taxation..... ."" However, the Court did not support use of the broader
powers that it now attributed to the federal government.'9 Rather, in
a precursor to later decisions, the Court relied upon Congress' discretion
to exercise appropriate limits on its power." By withdrawing such
public lands from sale, Congress might "prevent the State of Minnesota
from taxing a large area of its lands," but, the Court stated,
no such possibility of wrong conduct on the part of Congress can enter into the consideration of this question. It is
to be expected that [Congress] will deal with Minnesota as
with other States, and in such a way as to subserve the best
interests of the people of that State. That a power may be

189. Id. at 250. The Court noted that the State of Minnesota had agreed that "the full
control of the disposition of the lands of the United States should be free from state action." Id.
190. Id. at 242-43.
191. Id. at 250. These "were all matters withdrawn from state interference by the terms of
the enabling act and the Constitution." Id.
192. See id. at 250-52.
193. Id. at 242-43.
194. See id. at 243.
195. See id. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt's (failed) 1937 plan to pack the Supreme
Court with justices more sympathetic to the exercise of federal power and less concerned about
infringement on state sovereignty, decisions of the Court showed much greater deference to
Congress. See Note, The Property Power, supra note 11, at 826-27 & n.71. Congress, it was
now said, should enforce limits on its own power. See id. In theory, the states could protect
themselves through their role in selecting the President and members of Congress. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

injuriously exercised is no reason for a misconstruction of
the scope and extent of that power.96
The same practical restraint, in conjunction with increasingly broad
suggestions of power, was in evidence in the 1911 case Light v. United
States. 197 In Light, the Supreme Court held that a Colorado state statute

which provided that a landowner cannot recover for damages by animal
trespass unless the property is enclosed by a fence did not protect the
defendant from an injunction against driving cattle on unenclosed federal
reserve land.' 9 The Court based its decision on the United States'
"rights incident to proprietorship," finding that "[e]ven a private owner
would be entitled to protection against willful trespasses. . . ."'99 It is

true that, in dicta, the Court declared that the courts "cannot compel [the
Congress] to set aside the [public] lands for settlement; or to suffer them
to be used for agricultural or grazing purposes; nor interfere when, in
the exercise of its discretion,- Congress establishes a forest reserve for
what it decides to be national and public purposes."" However, the
Court considered these to be "rights incident to proprietorship," and
nothing more."°l
Although the early part of the century saw modest restraint, by the
mid- 1900s the Court's interpretation of federal power under the Property
Clause had clearly shifted to encompass a broader, more permanent
ownership of public lands with accompanying sovereign powers.2" A
natural forum for this change was in the context of national parks.0 3
Individual states had ceded to the federal government "exclusive
jurisdiction" over national parks, beginning in 1890 with Yellowstone
National Park.2' In 1928, in accord with previous decisions, a district

196. Stearns, 179 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added).
197. 220 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1911).
198. Id. at 535-38.
199. Id. at 537.
200. Id. Light's affirmation of the United States' right to hold lands pursuant to the Forest
Reserve Act of 1891 has been cited in support of a broad view of federal powers over lands.
See, e.g., Goble, supra note 11, at 510 n.63 (citing Light, 220 U.S. at 523).
201. Light, 220 U.S. at 537 (emphasis added). The Court noted that these powers were
those of a proprietor, "to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the
property belonging to it." Id. And indeed, the Court went on to say exactly "nothing" about any
federal sovereign powers, for it considered that the proprietary resolution "makes it unnecessary
to consider ... the other constitutional questions involved." Id. at 538. Thus, the Court skirted
the matter of sovereignty.
202. See Engdahl, supra note 11, at 324-25.
203. See id.
204. See Yellowstone Park Transp. Co. v. Gallatin County, 27 F.2d 410, 412 (D. Mont.
1928). By the Act of May 7, 1894, Congress declared that Yellowstone National Park " 'shall

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss4/3

32

Landever: Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and St
EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE AND THE NEW FEDERALISM

court in Montana held that such a cession of " 'exclusive control'
imports only administrative authority to care for the proprietary interests
of the United States in the lands, and not legislative and judicial
jurisdiction or political dominion ...... 05 Citing Supreme Court
precedent, the court held that "Montana, admitted upon equal footing
with all other states, thereby was vested with sovereignty and jurisdiction over all its area, and including the aforesaid strip of the Park, which
without the state's valid consent cannot be diminished. .. ."" Thus,
while the Montana court noted that "the [State] Legislature has power
to in effect cede such jurisdiction, and the United States to accept in
respect to limited areas" outlined in Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constithtion, the court concluded that the notion "that by
constkuction, implication, or otherwise the power extends to large areas
of the state and the inhabitants thereof, for a federal 'public park or
pleasuring ground' like Yellowstone Park, is at least doubtful.""°
The Supreme Court finally addressed the constitutionality of such
non-Article I land cessions in 1938 in Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry

be under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.' "Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C.A. §
24 (West 1894)).
205. Id. at 412.
206. Id.
207. Id. The following year, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of the State of Arkansas
to cede exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, and the power of the United States to accept
such exclusive control, pursuant to the Enclave Clause, over part of the Hot Springs Reservation
to contain springs and an Army and Navy Hospital for federal purposes. Arlington Hotel Co. v.
Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1929).
The Court noted plaintiffs' counsel's argument that:

mhe United States has the constitutional authority to maintain exclusive
jurisdiction over the tract.., as a national park, and that as the government
undoubtedly may use its control over all land within its exclusive jurisdiction to
provide national parks, it may, where land is ceded by a State to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Government, [treat this ceded land as] land which had
never come within the jurisdiction of the State.
Id. at 453-54. According to counsel,
by virtue of Article 4 of the Constitution, Section 3, Congress has power to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States, it may treat land ceded to it by a State for
the purposes of making a national park exactly as it would treat land which had
always been within its exclusive jurisdiction and subject to its disposition for park
purposes.
Id. at 454. However, the Court "[did] not find it necessary... now to examine this question"
of "constitutional controversy." Id.
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Co.2"' For the first time, the Court held that a state could choose to
surrender its sovereign powers over property, and thus provide the
federal government with exclusive jurisdiction over lands within the
state." 9 No longer was the federal government constrained to being a
mere "proprietor" of lands that fell outside of Article I's Enclave Clause
confines. And now, based on this case where authority was granted to
the federal government by the states themselves, the Supreme Court
stood at the top of the slippery slope of federal power over non-Enclave
lands.
B. State Sovereignty Without Land
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court recognized that it-and
indeed, the country-had embarked upon a new path towards expanded
federal authority over public lands. At no point did the Court signify
such awareness. Regardless of its design, the Court's decisions
comported with the expanded notion of federal power over lands within
states by limiting the notion of land as an object of state sovereignty
and a basis for equal footing. Increasingly, the Court quoted the
language it had used in equal footing cases in the 1800s, but misplaced
the sense of the holdings. For as the accepted meaning of federal land
"ownership" had changed in the 1900s, so too did the meaning of the
Court's words that affirmed the federal power.
The early 1900s saw the Supreme Court reiterate its support for the
concept of equal footing of the states at the same time as it validated
some unstated measure of federal power over public lands. In Coyle v.
Smith,21 the Court held invalid a provision in the Oklahoma enabling
act that mandated the location of the capital city of the state.2" ' The
Court based its decision on the requirement, encompassed within the
power to "admit 'new states into this Union,' " that the Union be "a
union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority."2 2 In dicta, the
Court seemed comfortable with the enabling act provision that the state
"disclaimed title to the public lands, and stipulated that such lands
should remain subject to the sole disposition of the United States";
208. 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
209. Id. at 529-30; see Engdahl, supra note 11, at 324-25. Collins was consistent with the
revolution in federalism that had occurred one year earlier. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., a new 5-4 majority broadly interpreted the federal government's power to regulate
commerce among states; the Court held that the power encompassed even local matters that were
within the states' reserved powers, if the matters substantially affected commerce. 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937). In NLRB, as in Collins, the Court was showing deference to Congress. See id.
210. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
211. Id. at 563-64, 578.
212. Id. at 567 (emphasis in original).
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"such stipulations," deemed the Court, were "within the sphere of
' The precise power embodied in the public
congressional power."213
lands disclaimer was not discussed, however.. The Court simply stated
that "[w]hatever force such provisions have after the admission of the
State may be attributed to the power of Congress over the subjects,
derived from other provisions of the Constitution. 2 4
The Court did address the power issue as it subtly revised its 1848
Pollardequal footing holdings in the 1913 case of Donnelly v. United
States. 215 In Donnelly, the Court noted that it had held in Pollard that
the state "could exercise all the powers of government which belong to
and may be exercised by [the original States], excepting with respect to
control over public lands owned by the United States. 21 6 A careful
reading of Pollardin context cautions against interpreting this so-called
"exception" as anything but temporary 7 Sixty-five years after
Pollard,however, the Court's distinction between the temporary control
of the federal government and the anticipated permanent control of the
states over the lands was largely ignored. Rather, a new meaning of
permanent ownership became attached to the Pollardphrase "owned by
the United States," allowing the Court in the 1900s to claim precedent
for limiting the new states' sovereign powers over lands within their
borders.1 s
Thus, with the power of the federal government to retain lands
regarded as settled, the issue ceased to be the power of the federal
government to own and control lands, and became, instead, the degree
to which a state had any authority over these "federal" lands. The States
did have some power. Even in lands deemed permanently federal by
withdrawal or reservation, the Court in Donnelly noted that authority to
punish crimes generally passed to the State upon admission. 2 9 The

213. Id. at 570.

214. Id.
215. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
216. Id. at 260 (citing Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 212).

217. See supra text accompanying note 102.
218. The subtle change in meaning seems to have occurred in concert with the society's
acceptance of the United States retaining and withdrawing lands. In Pollard'stime, when the
federal government was not expected to hold lands permanently, the phrase "owned by the
United States" would have been understood as referring to the temporary state of ownership--the
time when the government would hold the lands, pending settlement or other such disposal.
Pollard,itself, held that the United States was required by the Property Clause to distribute the
lands, such that the state would gain sovereign authority over the lands within its bounds. See
Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223-24. By the 1900s, however, when certain lands were
considered owned by the federal government, in the true and permanent sense, the Pollard
meaning would no longer be as clear.
219. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 271.
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Court affirmed its prior holding that "the organization and admission of
States qualified the former Federal jurisdiction over Indian country
included therein by withdrawing from the United States and conferring
upon the States the control of offenses committed by white people
22
against whites, in the absence of some law or treaty to the contrary.""
By the mid-1900s, the Supreme Court began to read some new
criteria and limiting conditions into the Pollardequal footing standard.
In the first equal footing case of that era, United States v. California,2 2' the Court chose not to "transplant the Pollardrule of ownership
as an incident of state sovereignty in relation to inland waters out into
the soil beneath the ocean, [because the ocean area was] so much more
a matter of national concern."2 '22 The basis for the Court's limitation
of the Pollardrule of state sovereignty over lands within state borders
was that "protection and control of [the three-mile belt off the ocean's
shore] has been and is a function of national external sovereignty. 2 23
The Court could functionally ignore the equal footing argument because,
it found, there was no evidence that even the thirteen original colonies
had acquired ownership to lands under the three-mile belt.224
At the same time, however, the Court in United States v. California
espoused an additional basis for its support for federal authority over the
lands under the ocean belt: the fact that Congress claimed such
authority. 225 The Court noted, "[t]hat the political agencies of this
nation both claim and exercise broad dominion and control over our
three-mile marginal belt is now a settled fact. And this assertion of
national 2 6 dominion over the three-mile belt is binding upon this
2

Court."

Thus evolved the notion that the assertion of federal power, and
judicial recognition of such power, could in and of themselves legitimize
the exercise of power. A contemporary scholar, Professor John Hanna,
acknowledged as convincing the arguments that "the makers of the
Constitution did not intend to give the new nation any such power [to

220. Id. (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Draper v. United States,
164 U.S. 240 (1896)).
221. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
222. Id. at 36.
223. Id. at 34. The government had argued more generally against the validity of the
Pollard rationale, asking why "ownership of [lands under inland navigable water areas], any
more than ownership of uplands, is a necessary incident of the state sovereignty contemplated
by the 'equal footing' clause." Id. at 30-31. This argument was not addressed by the Court,
however.
224. Id. at 31-32.
225. Id. at 33-34.
226. Id. (citations omitted).
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own land within a state] without the express consent of the states," and
that "[t]he Constitution made no provision for Federal ownership of new
territory," such that "[t]he most that should be allowed the Federal
are
government is a temporary trusteeship of public lands which
227
'
The
ownership."
private
or
state
ultimately to be transferred on to
necessary conclusion of these arguments, also recognized by Hanna,
would be that "the vast holdings of the Federal government within the
states for all sorts of purposes and without state consent are unwarranted
by the Constitution and are in effect an invalid Federal imperialism." But Hanna, like the Court, refused to accept such a conclusion.
Rather, Hanna insisted that "[i]f there were doubts as to the power
of the United States to acquire [lands], these have been resolved
decisively in favor of the Federal government, not only by the Supreme
Court but by the people through their elected representatives in the
Congress and the presidency." 2 9 Hanna concluded, "[o]ne may
question the wisdom of some or all of these developments, but one can
scarcely raise at this time the question of national power in respect of
them." In fact, the "power of the nation to retain such ownership
and control of public lands is so well settled that any citation of
' Ignored by this analysis is the fact that the
authority is superfluous."231
assertion and exercise of this new federal power occurred most
unequally in the various states, undercutting the established doctrine of
equal footing 2 Also disregarded was the fact that a minority of
227. John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519, 527
(1951) (citing, with approval, C.P. Patterson, The Relations of the Federal Government to the
Territoriesand the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949)).
228. Hanna, supra note 227, at 527-28.
229. Id. at 528. This analysis was supported by the Supreme Court's statement a few years
earlier that political processes protect state sovereignty. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405

(1938).
230. Hanna, supra note 227, at 529. Hanna even raised what he viewed as "troubling"
implications of the Supreme Court's interpretation of expansive federal powers. Hanna worried

that
[i]f the government should subsequently urge that its paramount powers required
sovereignty over New York harbor, San Francisco bay or the Great Lakes, the
existing nature of equal footing might require that to the Federal government would
flow the ownership of all the navigable inland waters of all the states and the
resources under these waters could be taken by the government without compensation.

Id. at 535.
231. Id. at 529.
232. The government in United States v. Californiaapparently recognized the potential
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states, those adversely affected by the new exercise of federal power
over their lands, could not likely protect themselves through their
representatives in Congress or their votes for President. 3
The next Supreme Court case, United States v. Texas in 1950,'
carved out a new limiting criterion for the application of the equal
footing doctrine: political, versus economic, equality. 5 The equality
of the states had always been viewed in terms of the impact on state
sovereignty; the Court quoted its statement in Steams v. Minnesota,
that "[t]he 'equal footing' clause has long been held to refer to political
' But
rights and to sovereignty."237
for the first time, the Court specified
an aspect that was not to be considered: "[Equal footing] does not, of
course, include economic stature or standing.""3 8 This new category of
"economic" was integrally tied to the concept of land
and property. In
support of this limitation, the Court noted that:
Some States when they entered the Union had within their
boundaries tracts of land belonging to the Federal Government; others were sovereigns of their soil. Some had special
agreements with the Federal Government governing property within their borders. Area, location, geology, and latitude
have created great diversity in the economic aspects of the
several States.239
Three problems with the Court's analysis are troublesome. First, even
in its own explanation, the Court was unable to disentangle the
"economic" from the "political." If only some states were
"sovereigns
of their soil," as the Court described, then those whose states contained
conflict between the newly asserted federal rights over land and the general doctrine
of equal
footing, and consequently argued against the Pollard rule entirely, even when
applied to
ownership of water lands. See United States v. California,332 U.S. at 30-31;
see also Hanna,
supra note 227, at 528.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.");
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT (1980) (writing that
the Court should defer to the
people's elected representatives except where a particular person or group
is unfairly
disadvantaged in the political system).
234. 339 U.S. 707 (1950) (holding that per the equal footing doctrine, the
Republic of
Texas lost sovereignty over and all claim to the marginal sea when she became
a state).
235. Id. at 716.
236. 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
237. Id. (quoting Steams, 179 U.S. at 245).
238. Id.
239. Id. (citations omitted).
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federal land were necessarily not equal in sovereignty to all other
states.2" Second, the Court treated the fact that the federal government
had imposed burdens on the equality of some states as the basis of
legality for those very acts. Ifthe Court had looked to the original
states-the states intended to be the standard for equality of all other
states-the Court's analysis would have failed.241 For all of the
original states were "sovereigns of their soil," and not a one had any
"special agreement" with the federal government that it did not enter
into as a full and voluntary participant.242 Third, while the "diversity
in the economic aspects" was a fluke of nature and state boundary lines,
once lines were drawn, all states were intended to be equal. As such, all
states were entitled to sovereignty over all of the land, no matter what
kind of land, within their borders.
Ignoring these analytical flaws, the Supreme Court proceeded to base
its new approach to equal footing on the facts of the day, 3 on new
meanings imposed on old decisions, and on the questionable declarations
in the 1950 United States v. Texas2" case. In Alabama v. Texas,245
for example, the Court quoted its 1840 holding in Gratiot: "The power
of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United
States 'is vested in Congress without limitation.' ,246 The Court did
not note, however, that Gratiot dealt with the powers of Congress to
dispose of property in territories, before statehood.247 Nor did the
Court acknowledge that Pollard,decided after Gratiot,clearly expressed

240. Given that the Court apparently did recognize that sovereignty was an issue, it is
possible that the Court accepted the differences in sovereignty of the states because it assumed
that individual states had surrendered their sovereignty over certain lands in their admitting acts.
The requirement that those states surrender their sovereignty over lands in order to become
states, however, would not be constitutional; the United States has no power in the Constitution
to deprive a state of its sovereignty as a state equal to the original states. See Coyle, 221 U.S.
at 573; supra text accompanying notes 210-14. At best, the United States had the power to
accept voluntary cessions of exclusive jurisdiction from the states. See Collins,304 U.S. at 52830; supra text accompanying notes 208-09. Thus, the forced agreement of the states is not a
valid disclaimer, and cannot form a proper basis for the Court's analysis.
241. See Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,436 (1867) ("ITihe new States since
admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction... as the original States possess
within their respective borders.").
242. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
243. Such a functionalist approach can be seen in other seminal Court decisions, as well.
See infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
244. 339 U.S. 707, reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 907 (1950).
245. 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (finding the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 29, 43
U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1356, which conveyed title to the soil under the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic
and the Pacific Oceans to certain states, constitutional).
246. 347 U.S. at 273 (quoting United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840)).
247. See Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 537-38; see also supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
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the expectation that the federal government ultimately would relinquish
sovereignty over the lands to the State.248 Instead, in his concurrence,
Justice Reed announced in Alabama v. Texas that equal footing "does
not affect Congress' power to dispose of [or not dispose of] federal
property. 2 49 Further, quoting United States v. Texas, he noted that
"[t]he requirement of equal footing does not demand that courts wipe
out diversities 'in the economic aspects of the several States.' ,250
So now, it appeared, the government had turned the disposal
provision in the Constitution on its head. No longer was the federal
government expected to dispose of the lands within newly admitted
states, such that all states were sovereign over territory in their
borders."' Rather, the recognized status quo was that the United States
retained the land, and the Court agreed that the federal government did
not owe the states the favor of disposing of the land to better the
"economic" straits of a given state.
State sovereignty was not
considered to be an issue.
The broadened power of the federal government over so-called
Article IV lands, with its concomitant lessening of the guaranteed
sovereignty of the states, was further supported by the Supreme Court
in 1955, in the case of Federal Power Commission v. Oregon. 3 In
FederalPower Commission,
the State claimed jurisdiction over federal
"reserved" lands;254 thus, the State argued that its consent, not just that
of the Federal Power Commission, was required for the building of a
25
dam on those landsY.
The Court rejected this position,256 holding
that "[a]uthorization of this [dam] project ... is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission.... "257 Even where
"the project will have [consequences] beyond the limits of the reserved

248. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
249. 347 U.S. at 275 (Reed, J., concurring).
250. Id. (quoting United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 716).
251. Compare Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221 (finding that the United States' right to
hold land was temporary, lapsing with a formation of a new state) with Alabama v. Texas, 347
U.S. at 273 (declaring Congress has the power to retain lands in the same manner as a private
land owner).
252. See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 273 (finding congressional power over public land
has no limit).
253. 349 U.S. 435 (1955); see also Engdahl, supra note 11, at 344-48.
254. 349 U.S. at 440, 442. The State "argue[d] that the Acts of July 26, 1866, July 9, 1870,
and the Desert Land Act of 1877 constitute[d] an express congressional delegation or
conveyance to the State of the power to regulate the use of these waters." Id. at 446-47.
255. Id. at 447.
256. Id. at 448.
257. Id. at 446.
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lands on which it will be located .... " the Court held that the State
had no power to interfere with the federal government's management or
use of lands owned pursuant to Article IV of the Constitution.25 9
C. FederalLands, FederalPower
The end of the second century of the United States' history was
marked by two bold pronouncements of federal powers over lands
within the states. First, in 1976, through enactment of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FPLMA),2' 6 Congress formally
repealed the land "disposal" statutes, including the Homestead Act of
1862.261 Although the United States had withdrawn and reserved vast
lands in the western states, for the first time the federal government
formally declared that its "ownership" of public domain lands was
permanent.263
Second, in 1977, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,2 the Supreme Court
upheld the existence of dual government powers 261 over these federal
lands. The joint exercise of power was not that contemplated by Pollard,
however, for the federal government's potential power was greater than
that over lands held by private interests or the State.2 6 The Court
considered Congress' power to own and regulate the lands to be
weighted against the state's jurisdiction over land within its borders.267
258. Id. at 449.
259. Id. at 437, 443,448-49. The Court noted that "the [federal] Commission acts on behalf
of the people of Oregon, as well as all others, in seeing to it that the interests of all concerned
are adequately protected." Id. at 449.
260. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
261. See FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2787-79 (1976). The
movement in the west to demand state title to the public domain, called the "Sagebrush
Rebellion," is considered to be in large part a reaction to the FLPMA. See, e.g., Babbitt, supra
note 11, at 853.
262. Recall that the first major land reservation was that of land creating Yellowstone
National Park, in 1872. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
263. The Public Land Law Review Commission, a group of elected officials, land use
managers, and public representatives assigned the task of studying and creating federal lands
policy, reported that the public lands "would not serve the maximum public interest in private
ownership." PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, ONE THIRD OF THE
NATION'S LAND 6 (1970).
264. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
265. Id. at 546. The federal government had sovereign authority, while the state could
exercise the police power as well as some powers of management over the lands. Id. at 545.
266. See Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223-24; see also supra text accompanying notes 91109.
267. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542-43 (recognizing that the state retains jurisdiction over
lands within the state to the extent Congress does not enact laws governing those same lands
under the Property Clause).
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Where there was no clear congressional assertion of authority, the Court
indicated that it would find no preemption of state authority.2"
In Kleppe, the State of New Mexico called into question the power
of the United States, absent state consent and contrary to state law, to
regulate lands held by the federal government under Article IV of the
Constitution.269 The Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act..
enacted by Congress "to protect 'all unbranded and unclaimed horses
and burros on public lands of the United States' . . from 'capture,
branding, harassment, or death' "27' directly conflicted with the New

Mexico Estray Law, which provided " 'the right to go upon Federal or
State lands to take possession of [all estray] horses or burros, should the
[New Mexico] Livestock Board so desire.' ""
On the basis of its interpretation of past decisions, the Court affirmed
the power of the federal government to legislate conduct on public lands
held by the United States pursuant to Article IV of the Constitution.273
The Court rejected the State's argument that "Congress' rights in its
land are 'only the rights of an ordinary proprietor ...

,-"

though

this was the description applied by the Court in the late 1800s. 5 In
support of Congress' broader powers, the Court cited cases such as
Light and Gratiot, which, the Court said, affirmed the power of
Congress "to determine what are 'needful' rules 'respecting' the public
lands., 276 The Court ignored the basic holdings of those decisions,
however: that Congress had the rights of a proprietorto protect lands
it held, and that Congress had the right to dispose of lands in a
territory.277 Once again, the Court blended interchangeably its prior
268. Id. at 543.
269. See id. at 533-35 (finding that the New Mexico Livestock Board's removal of burros
was in contradiction to 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the Wild Free-roaming Horses
and Burros Act).
270. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
271. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 531 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV 1970)).
272. Id. at 533 (quoting the letter of intent from New Mexico Livestock Board to the
United States Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture). The letter cites N.M. STAT. ANN. §
47-14-1 (1966). Id. at 532 n.2.
273. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 544 (distinguishing cases cited by New Mexico as either
inapplicable or supporting Congress' power to regulate federal lands).
274. Id. at 538 (quoting Ft. Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527 (1885)).
275. The Court founded its holding that Kansas maintained taxing jurisdiction over the
lands of Fort Leavenworth on the doctrine of equal footing. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 526, 542. Further,
the Court found that the federal government's position as an "ordinary proprietor" was based on
the doctrine of equal footing and dispositive of the rights Kansas held over the land. Id. at 527.
The Court dismissed this language as dicta. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.
276. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539 (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30
(1940); Light, 220 U.S. at 537; Gratiot,39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 537-38).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39, 197-201.
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holdings regarding (1) the federal government's rights over territorial
lands or lands temporarily held pending distribution within a state, and
(2) the federal government's right to hold lands permanently. Citing
cases from Gratiot to Alabama v. Texas, the Court endorsed an
"expansive reading" of the Property Clause,27 noting that " '[t]he
power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without
limitations.' ,279
True, the Court acknowledged that "[a]bsent consent or cession a
State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its
territory... ."' In particular, the Court held that the Wild Horses
"Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the public
lands in New Mexico .. .28" But, in language reminiscent of the
"exclusive Legislation" power expressed in the Article I Enclave Clause,
the Court also held that Congress, under the Article IV Property Clause,
"exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the
public domain.' 2 Thus, while the State had the right to enforce its
laws over these public lands, "when Congress [acts pursuant to the
Property Clause respecting its lands], the federal legislation necessarily

278. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.
279. Id. (quoting United States v. San Francisco,310 U.S. at 29). The Court also offered
six additional cases, Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958); Alabama
v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 273; FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952); United States v.
California,332 U.S. at 27; Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1872); and Gratiot,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 537, in support of Congress' broad power.
280. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 54243. In dicta, however, the Court suggested that Congress
might be able to withdraw federal public lands from the jurisdiction of the state. See id. at 544.
The Court did not indicate how, or on what legal basis, this might be done. The Court
disregarded the contrary holding in Wilson v. Cook that the United States "did not acquire
exclusive jurisdiction over certain federal forest reserve lands in Arkansas and the State retained
legislative jurisdiction over those lands... "'noting that "[n]o question was raised regarding
Congress' power to regulate the forest reserves under the Property Clause." Id. (discussing
Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1946)). The Court said only that " 'without more,'
federal ownership of lands within a State does not withdraw those lands from the jurisdiction
of the State." Id. (citing Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650 (1930)). The "more"
the Court would require was not defined. The Court emphasized that it had, in the past, "found
that Congress had not purported to assume jurisdiction over highways within [federal lands], not
that it lacked the power to do so under the Property Clause." Id. (citing Colorado v. Toll, 268
U.S. 228, 230-31 (1925)). The Court did not elaborate on the basis for such exclusive power,
particularly absent state consent or cession. See id.
281. Id. at 545.
282. Id. at 540 (emphasis added). In support of this holding, the Court cited Camfield, the
1897 case wherein the Court found that the federal government had "a power over its own
property analogous to the police power of the several States. .. ." Id. (citing Camfield, 167 U.S.
at 525). The Kleppe Court did not address the limitations expressed in Camfield on federal
powers over property within states. See supra text accompanying notes 175-86.
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overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause."2 ' The
question considered by the Court, therefore, became one of statutory
interpretation and preemption doctrine-i.e., does the congressional act
override state law-rather than one of a state's constitutional right to
power over lands.284
In National League of Cities v. Usery,285 decided just one week
after the Court rejected federalism arguments in Kleppe,28 6 the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from its willingness to permit federal
exercise of power in contravention of traditional state control.2"7 In
National League of Cities, the Court held invalid the extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage and maximum hours provisions to state employees.288 The Court recognized that "the Commerce
Clause of Art. I of the Constitution is a grant of plenary authority to
Congress

. .

.

,"

or, in Chief Justice Marshall's words, "the power to

regulate .
,,.""However, as the Court noted, "Congressional enactments which may be fully within the grant of legislative authority
contained in the Commerce Clause may nonetheless be invalid because
found to offend against" another constitutional right, such as the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.2'

The Court recognized in National League of Cities "that there are
limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even
when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate
commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution."29'
Specifically, "Congress may not exercise [its Commerce] power so as
to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions
regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be
made."2'92 The Court held "that such assertions of power, if unchecked,
would indeed ...

allow 'the National Government [to] devour the

essentials of state sovereignty,' and would therefore transgress the
'
bounds of the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause."293

283. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). The ability of the federal
government to displace state law makes this power over Article IV lands tantamount to the
absolute power of the federal government over Article I Enclave Clause lands. See Note, The
Property Power, supra note 11, at 824-25 & n.56.
284. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 448-49.
285. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 264-79.
287. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52.
288. Id. at 852.
289. Id. at 840 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
290. Id. at 841.
291. Id. at 842.
292. Id. at 855.
293. Id. at 855 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 39

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss4/3

44

Landever: Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and St
EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE AND THE NEW FEDERALISM

However, the Supreme Court's emphasis on state sovereignty in
National League of Cities was both limited and short-lived. In his
concurrence in National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun noted that
"it seems to me that [the Court's Opinion] adopts a balancing approach,
and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental
protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where
state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be
essential."294 Furthermore, over the next several years, the Court never
invalidated any other federal act on the basis that the United States was
usurping a state's sovereign powers.295 In 1985, the Court overruled
NationalLeague of Cities in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,2" holding that federal minimum wage and hours provisions
in the Fair Labor Standards Act could be applied to a municipal mass
transit system.2' The basis for the decision was the Court's belief,
once again, that states were protected against infringement of their
sovereignty by the political system, or the "structure of the Federal
'
Government itself."298
Despite the Court's renewed disavowal of protecting state sovereignty,299 the strong dissents in Garcia made clear that the Supreme Court
at the close of America's second century might reconsider its absolute
support for federal intrusion." For one thing, the Court did recognize

U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). The Court overruled Wirtz. id.
294. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented,
arguing the inconsistency with previous Court holdings that "nothing in the Tenth Amendment
constitutes a limitation on congressional exercise of powers delegated by the Constitution to
Congress . . . " and " '[t]he [Tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered.' "Id. at 862-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court additionally cited
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404-07 and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.)
304, 324-25 (1816). Id. at 863. Justice Stevens also dissented "from [the Court's] constitutional
holding. . . " though he "agree[d] that it is unwise for the Federal Government to exercise its
power in the ways described in the Court's opinion." Id. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. See TRIBE, supra note 89, § 4.10, at 164.
296. 469 U.S. 528, 557, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889
(1988). In the 5-4 decision, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court. Id. at 530.
297. Id. at 555-56.
298. See id. at 550 (finding the structure of government was the "principle means chosen
by the Framers to ensure the role of the States.... ."). The Court discussed the "influence'
vested in the states through the selection processes of the federal government, and concluded that
"the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over
the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in
discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority." Id. at 551-52.
299. See id. at 555-57 (finding participation in the federal government by the several states,
rather than judicial intervention, as the primary limit on federal power).
300. See id. at 578-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (forecasting that the Court would return
again to a baldnced approach to federalism); see also id. at 588-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
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exceptions where the Constitution demands that a state's sovereignty be
protected.3"' Indeed, even Justice Blackmun, for the majority, noted
that one of the "rare exceptions," where the Constitution does "carve out
express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not employ its
delegated powers to displace . . . " is in the "guarantee, in Article IV,
Section 3, of state territorial integrity. . . ."" Also interesting was the
fact that four Justices dissented on the basis of the historic and intended
role of states as "sovereigns" in the federal system of the United
States."' Justice O'Connor argued in her dissent that "[t]he true
'essence' of federalism is that the States as States have legitimate
interests which the National Government is bound to respect even
though its laws are supreme."3 "4 And Justice Rehnquist declared that
the principle of balanced federal powers over the states "in time [will]
again command the support of a majority of this Court."3 5
Ten years after Kleppe, though the Supreme Court continued to
speak of the "plenary power" of the federal government "to regulate and
dispose of land within the Territories," 3" the focus of the Court
appeared to shift again slightly toward recognition of the effects of
federal action on state sovereignty, and against a presumption of federal
preemption. In Utah Division of State Lands v. United States, in a 5-4
decision written by Justice O'Connor," 7 the Court looked back to 1894
and Shively v. Bowlby for the principle that "congressional policy to
dispose of sovereign lands [is to be acknowledged] only in the most
unusual circumstances.""3 8 The "sovereign" lands at issue were the
lands under navigable waters; in 1889, lands under Utah Lake were
selected as a reservoir site, " 'in accordance with the [Sundry Appropriations] Act of October 2, 1888.' "" The State of Utah argued that its

(finding that defining the balance between state and federal concerns "is and will remain the
duty of this Court .... ).
301. See id. at 550 (finding that although generally the Constitution does not provide
specific protection of state sovereignty, there are exceptions when it does).
302. Id. at 550.
303. See id. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger; Justice O'Connor's separate dissent was joined
by Justices Powell and Rehnquist; and Justice Rehnquist authored a separate dissent, as well.
304. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
306. See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 201 (1987).
307. Id. at 195. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Scalia joined
Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 194. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 209.
308. Id. at 197 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
309. Id. at 199 (alteration in original) (quoting letter from the Commissioner of the General
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claim to the lands under the equal footing doctrine could not summarily
be defeated by this federal reservation of land.1
The Court held that "we simply cannot infer that Congress intended
to defeat a future State's title to land under navigable waters 'unless the
intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain.' ,,31
Despite the Lake's inclusion in the federal government's 1888 list of
reservoir sites, well before the state's admission into the Union on
January 4, 1896,312 the Court held that "Congress did not definitely
declare or otherwise make very plain either its intention to reserve the
bed of Utah Lake or to defeat Utah's title to the bed under the equal
' As attested to by the dissenting opinion, such a
footing doctrine."313
conclusion obviously was subject to dispute.314 Thus, the inclination
of the majority to find no federal reservation was, itself, an indication
that the Court might lean more favorably on the side of the State in
considerations of sovereignty and federalism.

Land Office to the Land Office at Salt Lake City, Apr. 11, 1889, app. 21).
310. Id. at 200. The State argued that "only a conveyance to a third party, and not merely
a federal reservation of land, can defeat a State's title to land under navigable waters upon entry
into the Union." Id. The State's concession that the United States could convey lands under
navigable waters even to a third party could have been based on Shively v. Bowlby, the 1894
case where, as the Court in Utah Division explained, the Supreme Court "disavowed the dicta
in Pollard'sLessee, and held that the Federal Government had the power, under the Property
Clause, to convey such land to third parties ... " Id. at 196-97 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 48,

50).
311. Id. at 201-02 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)).
312. See id. at 199. The Court noted that the 1888 Act only reserved the land that "may"
be designated. Id. The Sundry Appropriations Act of 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371 (1890) repealed
the 1888 Act, but "provided 'that reservoir sites heretofore located or selected shall remain
segregated and reserved from entry or settlement as provided by [the 1888 Act].' "Id. at 199
(alteration in original) (quoting the 1890 Act).
313. Id. at 209. Thus, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the issue of whether or not
Congress could reserve the submerged lands. Id. at 201.
314. Id. at 209 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's
conclusion. Justice White wrote that "Congress plainly and specifically expressed its intent to
exercise that power [to reserve submerged lands] with respect'to Utah Lake" in the 1890 Act.
Id. The dissent therefore did not hesitate to address the issue of Congress' power to reserve the
lands. Justice White wrote that "[c]ontrary to the Court's opinion and judgment today, I am
confident that Congress has the power to prevent ownership of land underlying a navigable water
from passing to a new State by reserving the land to itself for an appropriate public purpose... ." Id. The "source of the congressional power ... " wrote the dissent, was the Property
Clause, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Id.
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IV. DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
IN THE THIRD CENTURY

A. A Less Than Manifest Destiny
In the first decade of the third century in United States history, once
again the cries from the west for state ownership or increased State
management of public lands have grown loud." 5 State title to the
public lands has been asserted by numerous counties in western
states.316 Two court cases filed in 1995-United States v. Nye County,
Nevada,3 17 brought by the federal government in Nevada, and Hat
Ranch, Inc. v. Babbit,"8 brought by Hat Ranch, Inc. and Otero County,

315. See id. (holding that Congress did not expressly reserve Utah Lake's bed). Since the
late 1980s, at least 70, and perhaps as many as 300, counties have passed or are thinking of
passing "anti-federal ordinances or resolutions." See LaGanga, supra note 8, at AI9. After the
1980 election of President Ronald Reagan, the "Sagebrush Rebels" of the late-1970s quieted,
their anger evidently appeased by the Reagan Administration's promise to address their concerns
by easing regulation and expanding business use of the lands. See C. BRANT SHORT, RONALD
REAGAN AND THE PUBLIC LANDS 9, 40-54 (1989); see also LaGanga, supra note 8, at A19.
President Reagan, himself, promised " 'to work toward a 'sagebrush solution,' " and pledged
that" '[his] administration will work to insure that the states have an equitable share of public
lands and their natural resources.' " SHORT, supra, at 9 (quoting Reagan telegram to rebellion
leader Dean Rhodes). The ultimate dissatisfaction with these pro-business efforts, coupled with
the 1992 election of President Bill Clinton, whose environmental agenda was perceived as a
threat to the business users of the lands, has contributed to the resurgence in angry demands to
wrest control and ownership of the lands from the federal government. See LaGanga, supra note
8, at A19 ("movement... was reborn with Clinton Administration efforts to raise grazing fees
and reform mining laws"); Jeff Arnold, Counties Take Lead as Sagebrush Rebellion Rides Again,
COUNTY NEWS, Apr. 4, 1994, at 5 ("Clinton Administration's agenda is to reestablish the
progressive environmental ethic though changes in management practices, fee structures and
policies affecting public land ....
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt's policies have
reignited the embers of the original rebellion.").
316. See, e.g., The Endangered West, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at E14 ("More than 70
rural Western counties have passed or proposed laws to 'take back' the public lands."). The role
of the counties in this debate is not clear, however. The "county supremacy movement," led by
Richard Carver, a Nye County Commissioner, claims that the Constitution provides counties
with the authority to regulate the public lands. See CBS Evening News: Forest Rangers in
Nevada Fear Violence as Local Residents Fightfor Control of PublicLands, 1995 WL 3026959
(CBS television broadcast, May 3, 1995). But even if the federal government ceased holding the
lands-if the states owned the lands or had jurisdiction over private properties-there is no
guarantee that the county land management or taxing opportunities would expand. Some state
lawmakers, including original Sagebrush Rebel Nevada State Senator Dean Rhoads, believe that
"[w]hile the second generation of sagebrush rebels gives lip service to the state ownership of
public lands, . . . in reality they are making 'an end run' around the state's political leaders to
get the lands managed by the various county commissions." See Vogel, supra note 77, at 15A.
317. See 920 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996).
318. See 932 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1995).
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New Mexico in the District of Columbia-directly raise the issues of
equal footing and federal ownership of public lands within the States of
Nevada and New Mexico.
The annals of the past suggest that arguments against federal
retention of public lands based on the equal footing doctrine and the
Property Clause should not be too quickly rejected. As discussed above,
in the country's first century, settlement of land was the desired goal,
and long-standing interpretation by the Supreme Court spoke to society's
understanding 319
of the role of land in the Constitution's guarantee of
"equal" states.
Language in state enabling acts disclaiming the
public lands cannot be used to resolve the issue. If interpreted one way,
the "disclaimer" simply might have been a reaffirmation of the federal
government's right under the Property Clause to distribute the lands,
which when sufficiently populated would become new states' 2
Alternatively, the requirement that a state "disclaim" its sovereign
powers over land might have been an unconstitutional-and therefore,
void-exercise of federal power. 21 Nor do the Supreme Court opinions from the last half century irrefutably decide the matter, for the
limitation of the equal footing doctrine and the expanded interpretation
of the Property Clause were based largely on new definitions and facts
inconsistently imposed upon old decisions and different analytical
frameworks.3"
Discussion cannot end, however, even if one concludes that the equal
footing doctrine demands that every state have sovereign control over
lands within its borders, that enabling act disclaimers are invalid, and
that second-century Supreme Court precedent is flawed. For the fact
remains that the United States has held vast amounts of land for over a
century, and the federal government's authority to do so has been
supported, ill-advisedly or not, by the Supreme Court for much of that
time.3
319. See supra text accompanying notes 83-111.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
321. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding a federal law
unconstitutional as it requires the State of New York, in the context of a voluntary compact
clause, to take title to low-level radioactive waste). New York v. United States is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 368-85; see also supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
322. See supra pt. III.
323. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 716 (finding that the equal footing
doctrine did not include economic stature or standing) (discussed supratext accompanying notes
234-50); United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 34 (finding that the three-mile belt off the
ocean's shore is a function of national sovereignty) (discussed supra text accompanying notes
221-33); Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 260 (interpreting Pollard's"owned by the United States" to have
a permanent, rather than the intended temporary, attachment to the land) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 215-20); Collins, 304 U.S. at 529-30 (holding that a state could surrender
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That federal disgorgement of public lands has not been considered
in the past decades, or that a Supreme Court ruling requiring such an act
could create bureaucratic havoc in land titles and resource control, is not
necessarily a basis for rejecting that course.3"2 Under a formalistic
approach, the Supreme Court's responsibility is to determine whether
particular government action is consistent with the plain mandate--express or implied-of the Constitution, even if the result is
serious and there are adverse consequences to the political system.325
The Supreme Court in Pollard, for example, made its equal footing
ruling despite the strong dissenting argument that
for thirty years neither Congress, or any state legislature,
has called in question the power of the United States to
grant the flowed lands, more than others ....
A right so
obscure, and which has lain dormant, and even unsuspected,
for so many years, and the assertion of which will strip so
much city property, and so many estates of all title, should
as I think be concluded by long acquiescence, and especially in courts of justice.326
Similarly, where the Court itself has made a prior ruling, the rule of
stare decisis highlights the importance of consistency in the law,327 but

sovereign power over lands within the state to the federal government) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 208-09).
324. In his 1980 article Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal
Lands, John Leshy argued that "[iut is nearly inconceivable that even the most activist, states'rights-oriented court would dare embark on such a course [of giving the public lands to the
States] now in the third century of our country's history ..
" Leshy, supra note 11, at 339.
Leshy, however, considered only the most extreme position of federal disgorgement; for his
analysis, he accepted the 1979 sagebrush rebel view that ownership of the public lands vested
in the States at the time of statehood. Id. at 327-28. By this rationale, then, all land titles-private and public-would now be subject to dispute. See id. at 327-29. Such a proposition
would, as Leshy wrote, "raise[] some fearsome possibilities." Id. at 328.
325. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding, under Article I,
Congress has no role in execution of laws and lacks power to control the executive, so Congress
cannot have removal power over a Comptroller General exercising executive functions); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-58 (1983) (finding that given the restrictions of Article I, Congress
can only act through bicameralism and presentment, not by a one-house legislative veto);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (holding that even in
an emergency, the President lacks power of legislation and thus cannot seize steel mills); United
States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895) (finding that if Congress could regulate a matter,
such as sugar refining, under its commerce power, local in nature as commerce and manufacturing are distinct, there would be "comparatively little of business operations and affairs ... left
for state control").
326. Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 232 (Catron, J., dissenting).
327. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855, 869 (1992) (finding that
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consistency with the Constitution ultimately may have a higher
value. 3"
Of course, functionally, there is little likelihood that such transfers
of title, with a recognition of state sovereign power, will occur. The fact
that a doctrine has come to be interpreted in a certain way often
indicates that there is a positive, even necessary, purpose that is being
accomplished. In his dissent in Dred Scott, for example, Justice McLean
argued the importance of finding a federal power of governance over
new territories; for "[w]ithout temporary Governments, our public lands
could not have been sold, nor our wildernesses reduced to cultivation,
and the population protected; nor could our flourishing States, West and
South, have been formed."'329 Therefore, he favored "acquiescence
under a settled construction of the Constitution for sixty years, though
it may be erroneous; which has secured to the country an advancement
and prosperity beyond the power of computation.""
Early in the nation's history, James Madison applied such a
functionalist approach to considering constitutionality when he showed
a willingness to bend to subsequent and "necessary" new assertions of
constitutional power. In the 1790s, Madison expressed his belief that
establishment of a National Bank was not authorized by the Constitution. In 1815, however, when a bill to establish a bank was offered in
Congress, Madison
"[w]aiv[ed] the question of the constitutional authority of
the Legislature to establish an incorporated bank, as being
precluded.., by the repeated recognitions under varied
circumstances of the validity of such an institution, in acts
of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the
Government, accompanied by indications, in different
because the abortion rule of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) was not unworkable, had
engendered reliance in society, and was based on law and facts that had not changed, "[a]
decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would address
error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's

legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law").
328. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and supplemented by Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (holding that contrary to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), the "separate but equal" doctrine violated the Fourteenth Amendment in an
education context); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[W]hen it
becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is unsound we are obliged to reexamine
the question.").
329. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 546 (McLean, J., dissenting). Even Justice McLean
did not go further than advocating temporary federal authority over the lands, however. See id.
at 542 (discussing the power of the federal government to establish a temporary government for

a territory).
330. Id. at 546.
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modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation."33 '
Madison recognized that, where there arose differences of opinion
regarding the meaning of the Constitution, " 'it might require a regular
course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of
them.' "332

There are at least two compelling arguments raised by those who
favor federal retention of power over public lands. One is environmental: protection of the natural resources of the nation, wherever they may
lie, is best accomplished by federal enforcement of national, comprehensive environmental regulations.333 The other is based on ecoiomics: the

331. See id. at 546 (McLean, J., dissenting) (quoting James Madison's veto message to the
1815 congressional Act establishing a National Bank).
332. H. Jefferson Powell, The OriginalUnderstandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 941 (1985) (quoting a letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819),
reprintedin 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (1865)). A similar
functionalist approach to determining constitutionality of actions can be seen in many important
Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the
judicial branch commission engaged in making mandatory federal sentencing guidelines does
not unduly intrude upon Congress' legislative role, though it does "to some degree commingle
the functions of the Branches"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that
independent counsel, though clearly exercising executive functions, does not unduly interfere
with Presidential powers under Article II); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
629 (1935) (upholding the substantial independence of alphabet agencies from the President and
recognizing their quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial character); M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
316 (establishing total immunity of the national bank from state tax); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803) (establishment of judicial review). One could also argue that the
mere fact that the founders expected that the original lands would be sold off to form new states
would not necessarily mean that the Constitution requiredsuch disposal. See, e.g., Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-09 (1972) (finding in each that, though the framers' experience was
with a jury of 12 members, whose decision had to be unanimous, the Sixth Amendment did not
mandate either requirement; thus, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a six member, or
non-unanimous, jury); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98-100 (1970).
333. See, e.g., Babbitt, supra note 11, at 849. According to Babbitt, "[t]he historical record
does not support the view that the states are responsible trustees of the public domain.
Throughout the West huge grants of public lands .... " conveyed to states, "were sold for a
pittance to ranchers, timbermen, and other special users." Id. Babbitt noted that "[m]any states
are incapable of managing the large land holdings they already have." Id. at 849-50; see also
Mark E.Rosen, Nevada v. Watkins: Who Gets the Shaft?, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 239 (1991).
Rosen suggests that
rejection of the equal footing doctrine as it relates to state enforcement of
environmental safety concerns was warranted because state enforcement of nuclear
matters would totally upset the statutory authority of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to make uniform national rules regarding nuclear safety and would
emasculate the safety provisions of the NWP..... Also, the panoply of NWPA
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federal government provides an immense financial infrastructure for the
protection and management of natural resources." Whether the state
or local governments could match (or would be willing to match) these
federal abilities is a matter of much debate today." 5
The case for validating the "regular course" of accepting federal
retention and control of public lands within states is made somewhat

environmental protections are supplemented by plenary environmental protections
afforded by NEPA, the Clean Air, and Water Acts.
Id. at 290-91.
334. See, e.g., Babbitt, supra note 11, at 850. Babbitt reported in 1982 that
[a]dministration of the public domain is a large and expensive undertaking. The
BLM [Bureau of Land Management] currently invests over $500 million each year
for soil stabilization and erosion control, reforestation, range-land rehabilitation,
and protection of archaeological, cultural, and recreational resources. The BLM
spent $24 million more in Arizona than it collected in the state during 1980. Forest
Service expenditures also far exceed revenues. Additional funds are dedicated to
the maintenance and preservation of national parks. The states would be unwilling
to match this effort if the lands were transferred to state ownership.
Id. at 850-51. The costs, themselves, continue to grow. In 1994, alone, the federal government
spent approximately $900 million on fire management in the states in the West, and annually,
the government spends $95 million to manage and improve public rangelands and more than
$300 million for facilities on public lands. Christopher A. Wood, The Warfor Western Lands-It
Was Never Theirs, but Militant Counties Aim to "Retake" FederalDomain, WASH. POST, May
7, 1995, at C2. As George C. Coggins wrote,
transfer of ownership under present conditions seems to make little financial sense
for states. The federal presence means payrolls, in lieu tax payments, highway
subsidies, water subsidies, tourism, revenue sharing, subsidized grazing, and a
spectrum of other direct and indirect dollar benefits to western states. Even
acknowledging the imprecision of economic cost benefit balancing, one must still
surmise that the West, if it won divestiture, could end up holding a pig in a poke.
Coggins, supra note 11, at 496.
335. See Robert H. Nelson, Transferring FederalLands in the West to the States: How
Would it Work?, POINTS WEST CHRONICLE 6-7 (1994-95). Professor Nelson reports that "[biased
on 1992 figures, if the Western states took over all lands and minerals now managed by the
BLM, a representative Western state would receive about $20 to $30 million a year less in new
revenues than its new management costs." Id. at 7. Nelson argued, however, that "overall, given
that a typical Western state would be taking possession of something like a quarter of its land,
the added fiscal burdens do not seem unmanageable." Id. Rather, he opined that "[t]he more
important consideration would be the confidence that Westerners have in their own state
governments and other political institutions to manage the land." Id. Nelson argued that
possession of the lands would enable the States to fulfill their function as" 'laboratories' of the
federal system," and would allow the States to grow beyond their current condition of "political
and economic adolescence." Id.
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stronger by both the ambiguity of the equal footing doctrine and the
actions of the States themselves. Contrary to the arguments of some
counties, the equal footing doctrine does not "vest" title to all lands in
the State upon admission.336 To read the Constitution consistently, the
equal footing doctrine must allow the United States to dispose of the
unappropriated lands, pursuant to the Property Clause; thus, even
Pollardrecognized that the federal government held lands within a state
temporarily, and could sell or grant the lands to private parties.3 37
Nor is there any provision in the equal footing doctrine for the
exceptional case where the federal government attempts to dispose of
property, and finds no willing takers. Such was the case for much of the
land now held by the United States.338 Before the federal government
formally reserved or retained the lands, and despite the federal proffer
of available land, these lands were neither claimed nor deemed desirable
by private individuals.339 The States, themselves, similarly expressed
no interest in the lands. In 1929, President Herbert Hoover told
Congress that the western states " 'are today more competent to
manage' the public lands 'than is the Federal Government. Moreover we
must seek every opportunity to retard the expansion of Federal
bureaucracy and to place our communities in control of their own
destinies.' "" President Hoover therefore recommended that the
unappropriated lands be ceded to the states, believing that " '[f]or the
best interest of the people as a whole, and people of the western states
and the small farmers and stockmen by whom they are primarily used,
[the lands] should be managed and the policies for their use determined
by state governments.' ""',Ultimately, however, the states in the West

336. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Brief at 4, 22, United States v. Nye County,
920 F. Supp. 1108 (No. 90-15128).
337. See Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221, 224; supra text accompanying notes 95-109.
338. For several decades, until at least the end of the 1800s, reservation of lands (such as
Yellowstone National Park) was the anomaly; most lands were available for disposal. See
CLAWSON & HELD, supra note 66, at 27-28.
339. Individuals could have claimed the lands in accordance with a number of federal land
distribution acts. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
340. See GATES, supra note 51, at 524 (quoting President Hoover's 1929 address to
Congress, reprinted in RAY L. WILBUR & ARTHUR M. HYDE, THE HOOVER POLICIES 230

(1937)).
341. See id. at 524-25 (quoting President Hoover's 1929 address to Congress, reprinted in
RAY L. WILBUR & ARTHUR M. HYDE, THE HOOVER POLICIES 232-33 (1937)). According to
Gates, the Public Land Committee, authorized by Congress to study the public domain issues,
recommended that "[areas important for national defense, reclamation, national forests, national
parks and bird refuges should be reserved ....
The balance of the public domain useful for
grazing should be given the states if and when they were prepared to accept it and provide
administrative control of use." Id. at 525-26.
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rejected the government proposals to transfer the lands to the states. 42
Therefore, it is possible to view the States' refusal to take the lands as
a constructive cession of the lands. Yet, the exact powers arguably
ceded by the states were not defined.
B. Shared Authority Over Public Lands
Whatever the basis of federal or state authority, legitimate or not, the
actual exercise of power over the public lands has always been shared.
Certainly Congress has always recognized state jurisdiction and
involvement with the public lands within state borders; most striking
about the federal government's declared "unlimited" power has been the
government's non-use of such power.343 State police power, for
example, typically is in force "over the federal public domain, at least
when there is no legislation by Congress on the subject."'
In fact, the United States government itself points to this sharing of
sovereign authority over the public lands in Nye County as proof that
federal retention of the lands "does not improperly impact the sovereignty of the State of Nevada or Nye County." 45 To refute the County's
argument that "its land-use and economic planning has been hampered"
and that "the federal government has taken over 'core' state functions
such as its police powers and its other sovereign rights as a land
manager, a lawmaker, and a condemnor of private property,"3" the
342. See id. at 527-28; see also Coggins, supra note 11, at 495-96 (finding that the lands
"were rejected as worthless by waves of settlers for nearly a century.... They were offered to
the western states... several times before, but the states refused to accept them because they
wanted no part of the burden of managing unclaimed, arid wastelands."). The states did not want
the lands unless they could have all of the lands and resources; they were not willing to accept
the lands if the United States reserved any land or withheld mineral rights to the lands. See
GATES, supra note 51, at 527-28. The states also benefitted from federal land holdings, because
the share of federal highway aid was proportional to the .amount of land in a state that was
federally owned. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 387. Cowart and Fairfax argue that
important State interests were also mollified by the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act, which "was an
almost complete victory for the range cattle industry... "' providing ranchers with open access
to the rangeland, while restricting use by homesteaders and sheep operators. Id. at 389. State
attempts to gain title to the public lands can be traced, historically, to grazers' concerns about
grazing fees and rangeland restrictions. Id. at 390-93. Calls for land distribution were heard, for
example, following the imposition of environmental requirements in the mid-1970s, such as the
mandate that grazing management plans include an Environmental Impact Statement. See id. at
393.
343. See, e.g., Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 532.
344. See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) (permissible to prohibit sheep
from grazing on cattle lands).
345. See Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum at 17, United States v. Nye County, 920 F. Supp.
at 1108 (No. 90-15128).
346. Id. (citations omitted).
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United States declares that the argument "is premised on attacking a
position never taken by the United States-that the United States has
exclusive jurisdiction over the public lands."347 The government, says
the United States in its Nye County reply brief, "has never claimed
exclusive jurisdiction over these lands. To the contrary, the United
States fully acknowledges that the State has the authority to regulate
certain activities on the public lands," as well as "law enforcement
' Interestingly, the
authority over persons within certain public lands."348
United States in its Nye County briefs is absolutely silent about the
Supreme Court's implication in Kleppe that the federal government
could claim exactly the exclusive jurisdiction that the United States
takes such pains here to disavow.349
C. New Federalism: Limiting Federal Power
The United States' position in Nye County is consistent with a
growing emphasis, both by the Supreme Court and by federal and state
legislatures, on a new form of Madisonian federalism. At issue is just
how the federal and state powers should be divided over the public
lands, where, beyond its traditional capacity as national authority, the
federal government has assumed an additional, ill-defined role as both
proprietor and "plenary" authority." Particularly where a right of
questionable federal authority is recognized, it is important for that right
to be exercised with utmost restraint by Congress and interpreted with
utmost restraint by the reviewing courts.3"'

347. Id. at 17-18.
348. Id. at 18. The government cites to the Organic Act of 1987, 16 U.S.C.A. § 480 (state
law enforcement power within national forests is unaffected "by reason of their existence"), and
to the Cooperative Law Enforcement Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 551a (" '[t]his section shall not deprive
any State or political subdivision thereof of its right to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction,
within or on lands which are a part of the national forest system' ").
349. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 544.
350. The term "plenary" means "[f]ull, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court described the federal
government's power over the public lands as "plenary" in California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987), discussed infra text accompanying notes 353-56.
351. For example, Learned Hand urged restraint in the exercise of judicial review. See
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14-15 (1958). Judge Hand did not believe that the power
of judicial review could be clearly deduced from the intent of the framers or from the
Constitution, itself, but he recognized that some measure of judicial review was necessary. Id.
Thus, he wrote, as such, review is "but only a practical condition ... it need not [always] be
exercised ..
" Id.
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1. New Federalism and the Court
Recent Supreme Court decisions, where the Court has shown
restraint in its findings of federal preemption, indicate that the Court is
moving toward recognition of a new type of federalism. 2 In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., for example, the Supreme
Court held that federal law-including forest service regulations, land
use statutes, and the Coastal Zone Management Act--did not preempt
imposition of a California Coastal Commission permit requirement on
an unpatented mining claim in a national forest. 3 Dual- regulation was
to be accommodated, if possible; the Court held that a State can enforce
its criminal and civil laws on federal lands "so long as those laws do not
conflict with federal law."3 Quoting Kleppe, the C6urt noted that
"'[a]bsent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction
over federal lands within its territory ....
", Preemption occurs only
if it is Congress' intention" 'to occupy a given field,' "or if state law
"'actually conflicts with federal law,' " so that it is " 'impossible to
comply with both' " and the state law " 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 356
Exercising caution in finding federal preemption is particularly
important in the United States' "system of dual sovereignty .. . ," the
Supreme Court instructed in Gregory v. Ashcroft.17 In Gregory, the
Court held that the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act did
not apply to state judges. 3 s The Court reminded the states and the
federal government that the United States is a government of limited

352. The application of the Supremacy Clause can dictate the measure of federal restraint.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Congress can preempt state law).
353. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 589, 594 (1987).
Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackrnun; Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part
and dissented in part; Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice White. Id. at

574.
354. Id. at 580 (citing Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543).
355. Id. (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543).
356. Id. at 581 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)). The
Court further declared that "it is appropriate to expect an administrative regulation to declare any
intention to pre-empt state law with some specificity .. " Id. at 583.
357. 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). Once again, Justice O'Connor authored the Opinion, joined
this time by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, and in two parts
by Justices White and Stevens. Id. at 454.
358. See id. at 473 (holding that the ADEA did not prohibit Missouri's mandatory
retirement provision). While Gregory specifically addressed the police power of the states within
land historically subject to state jurisdiction, the same principle should apply in the public lands
arena.
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powers only." 9 Quoting James Madison in the Federalist Papers, the
Court -noted that:
The powers ... which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.... The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.' 6°
Joint sovereignty was intended to create a more responsive government,
and to provide a check on
to encourage innovation and experimentation,
3 61
power.
government
of
abuses
In particular, the Court in Gregory limited the reach of the Supremacy Clause in order to protect state sovereignty.362 The Supremacy
Clause is a power that "Congress does not exercise lightly."3 63 If it
"intends to preempt the historic powers of the States," declared the
Court, then "Congress should make its intention 'clear and manifest.' ,364 The States "retain substantial sovereign powers," and even
"[a]s against Congress' powers," "principles of federalism" serve to
"constrain Congress' exercise of... powers. ' ' 365 Thus, the Court
rejected the use of "mere congressional ambiguity" to preempt state law;
rather, it must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers the state
law. 3' The Court concluded that "[iun the face of such ambiguity, we
will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental
functions.... 367

359. Id. at 457.
360. Id. at 458 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
361. Id. at 458-59.
362. See id. at 460 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 461 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
365. Id. at 461, 464, 468. The Court refused to assume congressional intent to subvert state
powers, even if Congress acted pursuant to such broad delegated powers as the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 470. Justice White protested that the Fourteenth
Amendment provided a "sweeping constitutional delegation of authority to Congress ..... Id.
at 479 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court found the authority
limited, nonetheless, and declared, for example, that "[a]s against Congress' powers '[t]o
regulate Commerce' . . . , the authority of the people [to determine their state officials'
qualifications] may be inviolate." Id. at 464 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 3).
366. Id. at 464 (citing TRIBE, supra note 89, § 6-25, at 480).
367. Id. at 470.
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In the 1991 case New York v. United States,3" the Supreme Court
continued to follow a new path of federalism, as it explicitly joined the
limitation of federal authority to the required protection of state
sovereignty.369 The State of New York challenged a provision in the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act that required states to take
title to and possession of waste-generating property, and to assume
liability for all damages incurred in relation to that property when the
state was unable to arrange for disposal of the radioactive water.37
The Court held the provision unconstitutional, because it forced states
"'
to implement federal regulation.37
As it had in Garcia,3" the Court based the decision of whether a
power properly was a federal or state power by determining whether (1)
the Act was authorized by powers delegated to the Congress in Article
I of the Constitution,373 and (2) whether the Act "invades the province
'
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment."374
The Tenth
Amendment provides thaf "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.""37 Yet, although the Court
cited Garciain support, the Court's consideration of the powers of the
States and the Tenth Amendment in New York v. United States provided
an important signal of a change in its approach to questions of state
sovereignty. In Garcia, the Court had held that state representation in
the political process, not really the Tenth Amendment, protected state
sovereignty; "the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself. ' 376 Thus, in Garcia, the Court declared that
it was wrong for "an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about
which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 3 " In New

368. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
369. See id. at 156 (finding "if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reversed by the

Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power that the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress").

370. Id. at 153.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

See id. at 161.
See supra text accompanying notes 296-305.
See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155-56 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Garcia,469 U.S. at 550.
Id. at 546.
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York v. United States, the Court, with a new majority,378 showed that
it was no longer so reluctant to enter the fray.
The Court paid short shrift to the United States' arguments of federal
necessity: " 'The question is not what power the Federal Government
ought to have but what powers in fact have been given by the people.' ,,3 Necessity was considered too convenient and dangerous a
reason to alter the balance of powers. As the Court noted, "the
Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power
among sovereigns . . . precisely so that we may resist the temptation to
concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis
of the day.z38 Similarly, the Court in New York v. United States
dismissed the notion that the States could acquiesce to improper
expansion of federal power and diminution of state power, or that a
State, by its acquiescence, could be estopped from challenging the
constitutionality of such an arrangement. 381' The Court held that the
"Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments
for the protection of individuals," such that "[w]here Congress exceeds
its authority relative to the States, . . . the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state officials. 382
Instead, the Court pointed to ways Congress could "urge a State to
adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. 3 3 The
government could use the spending power to influence the States,
"attach[ing] conditions on the receipt of federal funds."3 4 Alternatively, the Court recognized that the government could give the States a
choice between regulating activity in accordance with federal standards,
or facing preemption by federal regulation.385

378. Justices Brennan and Marshall from the majority opinion in Garcia had retired from
the Court prior to the New York decision. GEOFFREY R. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxxxiilxxxiii (2d ed. 1991). Justices Thomas and Souter replaced them and joined the Garcia minority,
along with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell's replacements (Justices Scalia and Kennedy)
to form the new majority. Id.
379. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 63 (1936)).
380. Id. at 187.
381. See id. at 181.
382. Id. at 181-82. The Court reiterated its position that "[t]he constitutional authority of
Congress cannot be expanded by the 'consent' of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby
narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States." Id. at 182.
383. Id. at 166.
384. Id. at 167.
385. Id. An example is the Clean Water Act, which " 'anticipates a partnership between
the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective ..
Id. (quoting
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992)).
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Perhaps the clearest reflection of the strengthening of a new thread
of federalism was the Supreme Court's 1994-95 term. Two cases, in
particular, prompted intense discussion in and around the Court about
the nature of federal power and the limits to the exercise of that power
vis-,.-vis the states. In United States v. Lopez,386 a split Court held that
a federal law that made possession of a firearm in a known school zone
a federal offense exceeded the authority of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.387 In United States Term Limits, Inc. V.
Thornton,388 four members of the Court, in dissent, opined that an
Arkansas constitutional amendment, which prohibited the appearance of
a candidate's name on a ballot for Congress after the candidate had
served three terms in the United States House of Representatives or two
terms in the United States Senate,389 was a constitutional exercise of
the state's "reserved" powers."
Contrary to its general position in the second century, the Supreme
Court in Lopez emphasized the need for the Court to actively participate
in the debate over federal and state power, rather than simply assume its
usual deferential posture toward Congress.39 In his concurrence,
Justice Kennedy wrote that, though political officials have a duty "to
preserve and protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal
balance... , the absence of structural mechanisms to require those
officials to undertake this principled task, and the momentary political
convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against a
complete renunciation of the judicial role."3 ' Thus, he concluded that
"the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure
and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability

386. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
387. Id. at 1626 (deciding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §
992(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993) exceeded the Commerce Clause power of Congress). The Lopez
majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas;
Justice Kennedy also filed a concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas filed
a powerful separate concurrence. Id. at 1625 .(reporter of opinion's summary of the Justices'
positions). Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, and
Justices Stevens and Souter wrote separate dissents, as well. Id.
388. 115 S.Ct. 1842 (1995).

389. Id. at 1845.
390. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote for the dissenters, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia. The majority, consisting of Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer (with Kennedy also authoring a separate
concurrence), held that the amendment violated the Qualifications Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 2 and art. I, § 3, cl. 3. Id. at 1845.
391. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1633-34.

392. Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the
'
scales too far."393

As to the federal powers, the Chief Justice, in his Opinion for the
Court in Lopez, described those powers delegated to the federal
government as "few and defined," especially compared with those of the
states; "[tihose which are to remain in the State governments are
'
numerous and indefinite."394
The United States Constitution "creates
a Federal Government of enumerated powers . . . " the Court held,

citing to Article I, Section 8."' Quoting language from Gregory, the
Court in Lopez held that " 'a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.' ,396
To maintain such a balance of power, the Court in Lopez invalidated
expansive application of the Commerce Clause, holding that it would
usurp power "in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign. ' 397 The Court refused
"to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States. 398 In his concurrence,
Justice Thomas noted that the Court has "always

. .

. rejected readings

of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would
permit Congress to exercise a police power.''399 But the problem with
the " 'substantial effect' " on commerce test was that "[t]his test, if

taken to its logical extreme, would give Congress a 'police power' over
all aspects of American life."4" Thus, Justice Thomas argued that,
even though the Court might always reject such a result, it would make
more sense to change the standard."'
A similar situation is created where Congress is deemed to have the
authority to usurp any and all state powers on vast lands that are within
state borders but claimed by the United States under Article IV. It is
true that the United States has such authority over some lands, such as
those acquired under Article I. In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Thomas

393. Id.
394. Id. at 1626 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
395. Id.
396. Id. (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458).
397. Id. at 1632. The Court noted that "depending on the level of generality, any activity
can be looked upon as commercial." Id. at 1633.
398. Id. at 1634.
399. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1642-43 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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noted that an exception to the rule that Congress cannot exercise a
police power is that "Congress could enact such [murder or felony] laws
for places where it enjoyed plenary powers-for instance, over the
District of Columbia."' But Justice Thomas found that "[t]he grant
of comprehensive legislative power over certain areas of the Nation,
when read in conjunction with the rest of the Constitution, further
confirms that Congress was not ceded plenary authority over the whole
Nation.'""43 By the reasoning of Lopez, even though the United States
has never purported to exercise such exclusive powers over the larger
areas of public land within the states, and even if the Court would reject
an actual assertion of such extreme powers, a less expansive application
of the Property Clause could best achieve the desired result: protecting
the federal and state balance of powers in the public lands.
Lopez provides a practical rationale for splitting federal and state
powers in the context of the public lands. Justice Kennedy explained in
his concurrence that, especially where "considerable disagreement exists
about how best to accomplish" objectives, then "the theory and utility
of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the
best solution is far from clear."'
In the second important federalism decision, United States Term
Limits, Inc., a majority of the Court recognized that the "States
unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority."' The Court quoted Alexander Hamilton's declaration
that the plan of the Constitutional Convention did not
contemplate "[a]n entire consolidation of the States into one
complete national sovereign," but only a partial consolidation in which "the State governments would clearly retain
all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and
which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the
United States. ' ' 406

402. Id. at 1648 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 426, 428 (1821)).
403. Id. at 1644 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). A 1790 Act, in fact,
specifically limited the right of the federal government to outlaw such crimes as murder and
maiming, to instances "when those acts were either committed on United States territory not part
of a State or on the high seas." Id. at 1648 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Act of April 30,
1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112) (emphasis added).
404. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
405. United States Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854 (quoting Garcia,469 U.S. at 549, and
citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 15).
406. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198) (emphasis in original).
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Thus, as Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, the corollary to the
rule that "the State may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty"
is the "proposition that the Federal Government must be held within the
boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to
the States. 4 °7
Nonetheless, the five-member majority in United States Term
Limits48 held that the "power to add qualifications [for Congressional
service] is not within the 'original powers' of the States, and thus is not
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment."' Quoting Justice
Story, the Court held that" '[n]o state can say, that it has reserved, what
it never possessed.' ,,410 Such a standard-that if "no such right existed
before the Constitution was ratified" 41' then no such right is reserved-might defeat the argument that federal lands ought to be
governed in part by the states; since there were no Article IV lands in
the states at the time of the Constitution, 4 arguably there was no state
power over such federal lands at that time and therefore there is no state
power now. But the fact that the original states had sovereign powers
over all land within their borders is persuasive evidence that the States
did reserve their jurisdiction over all land. 3 It adds nothing to the
debate to say that the original states did not have jurisdiction over
"federal" public lands, for the government held no Article IV lands at
the time of the Constitution,4 4 and indeed, through most of the
country's first century. 5 Moreover, this position would beg the
question, for it assumes the validity of federal ownership of lands under
the Property Clause, an issue that is at the heart of the equal footing
debate.
It is the dissenting opinion of four members of the Court, authored
by Justice Thomas,4 6 that is particularly notable for its continuation
of the Lopez restrictive view of federal power and broad view of state
hegemony. The dissent argued that the powers reserved to the states in
the Tenth Amendment were not tied to those powers previously held, for
"[i]f someone says that the power to use a particular facility is reserved

407. Id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
408. Justice Kennedy joined the four-member minority from Lopez to create this majority
in United States Term Limits.
409. United States Term Limits, 115 S.Ct. at 1854.
410. Id. (quoting 1 STORY, supra note 115, § 627).
411. Id. at 1855.
412. See Gaetke, supra note 11, at 643 n.175.
413. But see id.

414. Id.
415. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
416. United States Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875.
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to some group, he is not saying anything about whether that group has
previously used the facility."4 r Rather, the dissent believed that one
should look only at the " 'traditional aspects of state sovereignty' ,,4..
or the " 'original powers of [state] sovereignty' "419 to determine if "a
congressional statute that appears to have been authorized by Article I
is nonetheless unconstitutional because it invades a protected sphere of
state sovereignty."4" Where there is no statute, and where the
Constitution does not bar state action, then, according to the dissent, the
State has the power to act.421
Thus, the United States Term Limits dissenters expressed their
objection to the majority's "enormous and untenable limitation on the
principle expressed by the Tenth Amendment." 4" According to the
dissent, the only cases where power is not reserved by the Tenth
Amendment are where power is expressly delegated to the United
States, expressly prohibited to the states, or delegated or prohibited "by
necessary implication." 4" In all other cases, the power is the states';
the "people had 'conferred on the general government the power
contained in the constitution, and on the States the whole residuum of
power.' q142
The dissent took particular exception to the majority's reliance on
Story for a limited view of state power and an expansive view of federal
power, noting that "[Story's Commentaries] represent only his own
understanding.... [T]his Court has deemed positions taken in Story's
commentaries to be more nationalist than the Constitution warrants."4'
Instead, Justice Thomas urged application of the Court's second century
dictate that " 'where there is ambiguity or doubt, or where two views
may well be entertained, contemporaneous and subsequent practical
construction[s] are entitled to the greatest weight.' ,426 Back in the late

417. Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This position is consistent with the definition of
"reserved" found in Black's Law Dictionary:"[r]etained, kept or set apart, for a purpose or a
person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1307 (6th ed. 1990). It is also consistent with the definition
of "reservation": "[a] clause in a deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the grantor
created, and reserves to himself, some right, interest or profit in the estate granted, which had
no previous existence as such, but is first called into being by the instrument reserving it." Id.
418. United States Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155-56; NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841, 849).
419. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garcia,469 U.S. at 549).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
422. Id. at 1877.
423. Id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406).
424. Id.
425. Id. at 1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (regarding 2 STORY, supra note 115, §§ 623-628).
426. Id. at 1903 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27
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1700s and 1800s, the understanding would likely have been one of
broader state power and more limited federal power; thus, there would
likely have been an expectation that states have power over all lands
within their borders.427
The concern in the Supreme Court for the role of the states, and
particularly the willingness of a majority of the Court in Lopez to limit
the federal government's exercise of its delegated powers where
necessary to protect the states' powers, highlights a new judicial sense
of the importance of the State in our federalist society.
2. New Federalism and the Government
This new emphasis of federalism is also the focus of legislators, both
in Congress and in the states. The fate of the public lands, in particular,
has become a source of concern both to the "states rights" advocates in
Congress and to environmentalists.42 A bill entitled The Public
Rangeland Management Act, for example, which was approved by the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in July 1995, would
increase the control of local ranchers over 270 million acres of federal
rangeland and would "free ranchers who use public lands from heavy
[federal] regulation."42 9
More dramatic changes have also been proposed. In the 103d
Congress in 1994, Representative Craig Thomas (Wyo.) introduced, on
behalf of himself and twenty-four fellow western representatives, a bill
that proposed to "transfer the lands administered by the Bureau of Land
Management to the State in which the lands are located." 4" Exempted
from transfer were lands that were "(1) wilderness; (2) wilderness study
areas; (3) areas of critical environmental concern; or (4) determined by
the Secretary [of Interior] to be too costly for the United States to
decontaminate. 43' In the first legislative session in 1995, Representa-

(1892)). In McPherson, the Court held that district-based selection of Presidential electors was
constitutional, based on the fact that such a process was used in some states in the first three
Presidential elections, and despite the fact that in subsequent years, most states used a general
ticket system. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 29-37.
427. See supra pt. II.
428. See Timothy Egan, In Battle Over Public Lands, Ranchers Push Public Aside, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al; Tom Kenworthy, Ranchers Drive Land Bill Through Friendlier
Hill, WASH. POST, July 20, 1995, at A25.
429. Egan, supra note 428, at A12; see also Kenworthy, supra note 428, at Al. The Act
is sponsored by Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.) and Rep. Wes S. Cooley (R-Ore.). Kenworthy,
supra note 428, at A25.
430. H.R. 4157, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Representative Charles Taylor of North
Carolina was also a co-sponsor. Id.
431. Id. § 1(d).
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tive James Hansen (Utah) circulated a draft of a similar bill requiring
the Secretary of Interior to "offer to transfer all right, title, and interest
of the United States in and to all lands and interests in lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management to the State in which such
' This newest bill would not exempt
lands and interests are located."432
from transfer any lands and interests in lands for environmental reasons.
Rather, the bill provides that designated "wilderness" areas "shall be
managed by the State as wilderness in accordance with the requirements
specified in the Wilderness Act... and any other Act of Congress
which specifically provides for the management of such lands.. .. ""'
Controversy over the actual impact of such measures grows as
opponents cite the harmful effects of decreased federal and increased
state control over the public lands. The proposed Public Rangeland
Management Act, said Mike Dombeck, acting director of the Bureau of
Land Management, "takes the public out of public lands," and "returns
land management to an era of single use at taxpayers' expense.""
Another critic, Karl Hess, Jr., an environmental studies fellow at the
Cato Institute, derided the benefits provided ranchers435at the public's
expense, calling them a form of "Cowboy socialism."
But the very nature of the federal debate has changed. Gone is the
idea that the federal government can do what it wants with public lands
without considering the states' interests and involving the State in the
decisionmaking process. While the Clinton administration opposes the
Public Rangeland Management Act (or the Livestock Grazing Act), an
alternate administrative plan created by Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt would, among other things, establish resource advisory councils
representing various local land interests.436 Senator Domenici and
Representative Cooley argued that their Act would allow not only the
ranchers but also the general public and the executive branch to
participate in grazing decisions; Senator Domenici insisted that " '[i]t
doesn't shut out any other uses' of the land... ."" Some congressional opponents of the Act, who also opposed Babbitt's proposal as being
too restrictive on ranchers, objected that the Domenici-Cooley legislation
" 'still locks out the public from decision-making ....
,"43' The focus
has shifted to shared management as well as shared use of the lands.

432. H.R. 2032, 104th Cong., Ist Sess., § 1(a)(1) (1995).
433. Id. § 3(a).
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Egan, supra note 428, at A18.
Kenworthy, supra note 428, at A25.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)).
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The States have been particularly vocal in support of expanding their
power and limiting the power of the federal government. The New York
Times reported in July 1995 that "[i]n the past year, at least 15 states
have passed resolutions asserting their sovereignty and rejecting all but
'
the most narrow role for the Federal Government."439
Colorado's
resolution, for example, quotes the Tenth Amendment and declares:
(1) That the State of Colorado hereby claims sovereignty
under the 10th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States over all powers not otherwise enumerated and
granted to the federal government by the United States
Constitution.
(2) That this [Joint Resolution] serve as a Notice and
Demand to the federal government, as our agent, to cease
and desist, effective immediately, mandates that are beyond
the scope of its constitutionally delegated powers.'
While the New York Times described such measures as the work of
paranoid, "right-wing extremists,""' their success across the broad
state and federal map is another sign of the growing interest, even in
mainstream America, in state power and sovereignty. 442

439. Dirk Johnson, Conspiracy Theories' Impact Reverberates in Legislatures-Extreme
Right's Outcry Scuttles Conference, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at Al.
440. Id. at B9 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1035, 59th Gen. Assembly (1994)).
441. Id. at Al. The Times noted that Colorado State Senator Charles Duke, a "prime force
in the so-called 10th Amendment movement," as well as others on the far right, such as
California State Senator Don Rogers, have also claimed that the federal government was
involved in bombing the Oklahoma City Federal Building and is consequently now engaged in
an elaborate cover-up. Id. at B9. Duke evidently believes that "[tihe Government's motive for
the brutality ... was to create a sentiment in the country for stronger powers for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms." Id. A Republican,
himself, Duke rejects House Speaker Newt Gingrich for being a " 'counterfeit Republican.' "
Id. According to the Times, Duke "has been criticized for his extreme views by state party
leaders." Dirk Johnson, Mild-ManneredEngineer Fans Firesof a Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1995, at B9.
442. See Johnson, supra note 439, at Al. In fact, the strength of this anti-federal, state's
rights movement is evidenced by the proponents' ability to force the cancellation of a nationally
touted Conference of the States. Id. Though the Conference was intended to provide a forum for
"finding ways of gaining more power for the states," opponents of the Conference, reported the
New York Times, feared that it would be "a clandestine Constitutional convention that could
nullify basic American rights, perhaps as part of a sinister plot to impose a totalitarian 'One
World Government.' " Id. Utah Governor Mike Leavitt, a Republican himself and chairman of
the Conference, decried the claims of the "extremists," noting that" '[w]e' ve been hearing some
of these theories about global conspiracies and international bankers for over 20 years.' " Id.
(quoting Gov. Leavitt). Ultimately, the detractors succeeded in convincing all but 14 states not
to participate in the Conference, and the organizers canceled the Conference because of

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss4/3

68

Landever: Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and St
EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE AND THE NEW FEDERALISM

D. Moving Towards CooperativeAuthority
In his United States Term Limits concurrence, Justice Kennedy wrote
that "[t]he Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of
their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other."" 3
Protection of this unique shared status is particularly called for in the
public lands arena, given the history of presumed state jurisdiction over
all lands-including federal lands, the fact of more than two hundred
years of cooperative power, and a practical recognition that the power
of the federal government over "its" lands is not an unlimited power.
The recent development of stronger federalism notions by the Supreme
Court suggests that the judiciary may provide a more formal basis for
federal and state cooperation in the management of public lands.'
Such cooperation is inherently encouraged in a system such as ours,
where there is a division of authority between the federal government
and the states: the federal government, pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause," is supreme within its own sphere; the states, under their
Reserve power,' have traditional police power within their domain.
Moreover, Congress may, by design, grant additional authority to the
states," 7 join with the states in exercising power,4 or forego exercising its own power." 9 Furthermore, the Supreme Court can act to
further federal and state cooperation in the context of public lands.
While the Court will not likely overrule the Kleppe holding that the

insufficient interest. Id. Ironically, Nevada State Senator Dean Rhoads, the lawmaker who started
the Sagebrush Rebellion in 1979 when he sponsored the original law that asserted State
ownership of federal public lands, had hoped to use the Conference of the States "as a forum
to secure more federal lands for states in the West." Vogel, supra note 77, at 14A.
443. United States Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
444. The notion of "cooperative federalism" has been raised before. See, e.g., Coggins,
supra note 11, at 496 ("A more likely solution is increased deference by federal managers to
state desires and further development of cooperative federalism."); Cowart & Fairfax, supra note
11, at 408 ('T1he system of cooperative regulation, which both fed and grew out of the
Sagebrush Rebellion, is vital to the environmentally sound management and use of public lands
and resources."). Recent changes in philosophy, in the Supreme Court, society, and government,
make a cooperative approach even more attractive and feasible today.

445. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
446. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
447. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422-25 (1946) (stating that
Congress can expand state power to regulate commerce among the states).
448. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205-16 (1983) (holding Congress' Atomic Energy Act did not preempt
California's moratorium on nuclear plants).
449. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543 (noting that Congress can choose to forego criminal
enforcement).
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federal government has sovereign power in the public lands, the Court
nonetheless should employ a functionalist approach to its review of both
state and federal assertions of power over the lands; despite this federal
sovereignty-which under a formalist approach would require a
presumption in favor of federal control-the Court should apply a heavy
presumption against federal preemption of state power. Congress can
expand federal and state cooperation, as well, by developing express,
non-preemption designs of shared authority, pursuant to which states are
specifically authorized to participate, under conditions specified by
Congress, in the lands management and decisionmaking process.4
Contrary to the fears of some environmentalists and the hopes of
some ranchers, an increase in state authority or decrease in federal
authority in the public lands does not equate with any particular result.
At the moment, it is largely the Republicans who have sounded the call
for state power, so it is largely the Republican message-pro-business
and anti-environment according to its detractors-that has become
associated with the state efforts."' Such an alliance is not necessary
or inevitable, however. In fact, preservation of a federal and state
balance of powers protects and strengthens the individual citizens' right
to decide societal norms and desirable government actions. A real
balance of powers should ultimately promote the libertarian notion of
free will, not specifically a Republican, conservative, Democratic or

450. Congress might also legislate federal economic design trade-offs, lending assistance
to those geographic areas on which Congress determines that federal environmental concerns
must have priority. Such assistance could assure the creation of diversified commercial
development, replacing environmentally harmful traditional industry. See, e.g., Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 111-15 (1978) (discussing New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law which restricted developer's capacity to make exterior alterations
to Grand Central Station and buildings in its vicinity but transferred lost development rights to
other land parcels instead).
451. See The Endangered West, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at E14. The Times editorial
decried the
war in the West and the war in Congress on basic environmental protections
[which] have much in common. First, both are being driven and in some cases
underwritten by big business. Second, both are being waged to save the "little guy"
from Federal tyranny. Third, this alleged little guy is nowhere to be found when
the time comes to draft crippling legislation. Indeed, his wishes [to protect the
environment] have been largely ignored.
Id. The Times noted that the current Sagebrush Rebellion is being "egged on by commercial
interests, "including ranchers, mining companies, timber barrons, developers, big commercial
farmers and virtually anyone else who stands to profit from relaxation of environmental
controls" and "by small but noisy groups of property-rights advocates." Id.
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" And the free choices of individuals could well cover
liberal agenda. 52
a broad ideological spectrum, perhaps favoring restricted government
authority on some fronts but continued or even expanded federal or state
government authority on others.
Bob Dole, former Senate Majority Leader and a 1996 Republican
candidate for President, may have recognized this fact (belatedly) in the
context of a "regulatory reform" bill. Dole, who co-sponsored a bill that
effectively would have overturned many environmental laws,453
showed a new willingness to moderate his position that coincided with
a Times Mirrorpublic opinion poll finding that "78 percent [said] that
government should 'do whatever it takes to protect the environment.' "" It is true that public sentiment has not prevented some
states from diminishing state environmental protections.455 But the
citizenry has not yet been required to face a world where the federal
government does not provide or ensure provision of desirable
protections. A realization that there is an altered balance of federal and
state powers should promote heightened awareness and action on the
part of wide-ranging interests in the states. Given the strong public
support for preservation of the public lands, both nationally and in

452. Roger Pilon, of the Center for Constitutional Studies at the libertarian Cato Institute,
explained that " '[w]hen you ask the question 'by what authority?' you are asking the most
fundamental question in law and in politics.' " Linda Greenhouse, Justices Court Federal
Decline, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 24, 1995, at Al (quoting Roger Pilon).
453. See John H. Cushman Jr., Crucial Democrat Joins Dole in Bid to Overhaul
Environmental Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at A17. Critics argued that the bill
would "sharply limit the Federal Government's authority to enforce regulations under laws that
protect health, safety and the environment." Id.
454. Gregg Easterbrook, A Green Comeback? Bob Dole Rethinks the Politicsof Pollution,
WASH. POST, July 9, 1995, at Cl, C2. According to the New York Times, "[p]oll after poll
suggests that what ordinary citizens want is more environmental protection if it means a cleaner
environment and a healthier society." The EndangeredWest, supra note 451, at E14.
455. See The EndangeredWest, supra note 451, at E14. The article discusses a "sample of
recent bulletins from the Old West," noting that "[d]espite citizen complaints, and nearly
unanimous editorial opposition," the State of Montana
rewrites some of the country's strongest water pollution laws as a favor to the
mining industry. Idaho lawmakers award potential polluters a major voice in setting
clean water standards. Utah's Governor rebuffs the stated wishes of Utah's citizens
to set aside 5.7 million acres of state land as protected wilderness. Washington
State's Legislature passes the nation's most far-reaching "takings" law, weakening
essential land-use controls. Wyoming's Legislature authorizes a bounty on
wolves-recently re-introduced into Yellowstone National Park and protected under
the Federal Endangered Species Act.
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western states, 456 protection need not wane as a result of increased
State involvement in overseeing and managing these resources.
Bringing the State and its citizens' interests into the political fold
also may have the collateral beneficial effect of diminishing the violence
that has dangerously clouded the public lands debate in recent years.
Even during the Bush administration, there were reports of ranchers in
the West threatening Forest Service rangers who attempted to enforce
grazing and environmental regulations. 57 Tensions rose further with
the election of President Clinton, 48 and there have been at least a few
instances of actual violence. In March 1995, a bomb exploded in the
Forest Service's office in Carson City, Nevada, and another exploded in
a National Forest campground in Lamoille Canyon in Nevada." 9 A
few days later, the Toiyabe National Forest headquarters in Sparks,
Nevada had to be closed and searched after the agency received a bomb
threat.46 In August, the threats became more personal, as a bomb
exploded a van parked at the home of a Forest Service ranger in Carson
City, Nevada. The house was damaged, but the ranger's wife and three
children, who were home at the time of the explosion, were not
harmed.4 1' Those in the so-called county movement have disclaimed

456. Many citizens in the West, particularly those who live in urban areas, favor protection
of the public lands for the enjoyment of multiple users. See, e.g., Christopher A. Wood, All
Uneasy on the Western Front-MilitantCounties Threatening to Take Back FederalLand Don't
Have a Leg to Stand On, WASH. POST, Nat'l Weekly Ed., May 15-22, 1995, at 24. In Catron
County, New Mexico, for example, "[niewly arrived 'green' groups have filed numerous
lawsuits and endangered species actions, leading to federal protection for the Mexican spotted
owl and the willow flycatcher, among other creatures." Charles McCoy, Catron County, N.M.,
Leads a Nasty Revolt Over Eco-Protection-U.S.Agency's Plan to Trim GrazingRights Sparks
Laws--and Lawlessness, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at Al, A4. With the departure in the 1970s
of many ranchers in the West, and the emigration to the West of people from the North and the
Midwest, the population in the West became far more diverse; unlike their rural counterparts,
the urban dwellers have "an agenda stressing environmental, aesthetic, and amenity values over
resource consumption." See ROBERT F. DURANT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY
REVISITED-PUBLIC LANDS, THE BLM, AND THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 12-13 (1992).
457. Jeff DeBonis, Buffaloed by the Land-Use Bullies, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at A25.
One rancher in southern Idaho allegedly threatened to" 'slit [a Forest Service ranger's] throat.' "
Id. (quoting the rancher). After learning of such threats, President Bush "acted firmly to stop the
angry ranchers in their tracks with a show of Government force" by sending a Justice
Department team to Idaho to investigate. Id.
458. See supra note 311.
459. 2 Forest Service Sites Bombed Amid "Sagebrush Rebel" Tensions, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 1995, at CL14. The bombs did physical damage, but did not injure anyone.
Id.
460. Id.
461. Two Nevada Bomb Attacks on Forest Service Probed,WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1995, at
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any formal involvement in the bombings, 62 but the combination of
anger against the federal government and a lack of mainstream political
channels for this anger clearly can prove lethal.463
As for the mainstream possibilities, just as a transferal of authority
need not result in a lessened effort to protect the lands, it is also not
evident that the federal government can do a better job of managing the
public lands on its own. In response to South Dakota Governor William
J. Janklow's request that the State be permitted to manage Mount
Rushmore and three other national park areas, Senator Tom Daschle (DS.D.) noted that " 'South Dakota has demonstrated real capability to
manage its state parks very well, and they'd certainly have the capability
to manage the federal parks as well.' "" South Dakota has already
taken over other federal enterprises with success; specifically, Governor
Janklow pointed to the state's lower-cost, higher-yield operation of a
former federal fish hatchery.46
Unfortunately, not all state land management and ownership efforts
have been so successful.4" For this reason, it is important to note that
even in the most extreme proposed legislation, the states would be
462. See 2 ForestService Sites Bombed Amid "SagebrushRebel" Tensions, supra note 459,
at CL14; Two Nevada Bomb Attacks on Forest Service Probed, supra note 461, at A3. Nye
County Commissioner Richard Carver suggested that "a Forest Service employee might have
engineered the [March] bombings to win sympathy for the beleaguered agency"; Jim Nelson,
superintendent of the Toiyabe National Forest, called that claim" 'ludicrous.' "2 Forest Service
Sites Bombed Amid "Sagebrush Rebel" Tensions, supra note 459, at CL14.
463. Even where groups do not themselves espouse violence, "their anti-federal government
rhetoric could lead individuals to act more extremely." See Chuck Raasch, Extremist Groups on
the Rise, GANNMr NEWS SERV., Apr. 21, 1995. Thus, for example, Senator Harry M. Reid (DNev.) believes that the August bombing of the ranger's home was the work of " 'extremist
elements' within the states' rights movement." Two Nevada Bomb Attacks on Forest Service
Probed, supra note 461, at A3. Bob Beckett, Nye County District Attorney, called the bombing
an example of" 'vigilante behavior.' "Id.
The coalitions forming along the fringe of anti-government movements can be very diverse,
with a central component of volatility. At an informal hearing before seven Democratic
Congressmen, "witnesses described an escalation of intimidation and violence by members of
self-styled militias, white supremacists and other fringe groups like the Freemen, Wise Users,
and Constitutionalists, whose profound dislike of government and regulations shape their
political agendas." Michael Janofsky, Accounts of Violence by ParamilitaryGroups,N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 1995, at A14. A National Park Service special agent reported that" '[t]he rage and hate
is beginning to well up.... We've always gotten threats against our employees. But now, we
hear death: 'You're going to be killed' or 'You'll be shot.' In the past, it was just, 'a rancher
is mad at us.' " Id. (quoting Robert Mariott, an agent for the National Park Service).
464. Bob Mercer, South Dakota Wants a Piece of the Rock: State Proposes Managing
National Parks, Including Mount Rushmore, WASH. POST, July 4, 1995, at A8.
465. Mercer, supra note 464, at AS.
466. See, e.g., Babbitt, supra note 11, at 849 ("[The historical record does not support the
view that the states are responsible trustees of the public domain.").
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required to manage the lands as directed by any applicable federal
legislation. 467 The Supremacy Clause does not fade simply because the
federal government is not solely responsible for management duties.
Moreover, the advantage of the proposed system of cooperative
federalism is that there is shared responsibility, mutual checks and
balances, and a general course set by federal design. In 1982, thenArizona Governor Bruce Babbitt suggested in a law review article that
the solution to the Sagebrush Rebellion lies not in transferring ownership from the federal government to the states, but in the honest sharing
of management control. 468 The states, wrote Babbitt, resented the
federal government's lax interpretation of the legislative directives to act
consistent with state efforts, and they were angry at the government's
'
assertion of power "without limitations."469
Babbitt proposed that
federal lands be subject to all state laws and requirements, including
zoning, leasing, and permitting, except in the case of overriding national
interest.47 Such a sharing arrangement has been used successfully in
the context of coastal zone management, 7' albeit a traditional area of
primary state jurisdiction where few laws governed.
Many federal environmental laws already require some measure of
state and local participation or consideration in agency actions. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) implementing regulations,
for example, mandate that:

467. See, e.g., H.R. 2032, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(a) (1995) (directing states to manage
lands designated as wilderness in accordance with the Wilderness Act or any other applicable
Act of Congress); see supra notes 432-33 and accompanying text.
468. See Babbitt, supra note 11, at 853-54. Babbitt serves as Secretary of the Interior in
the Clinton Administration.
469. Id. at 856, 858 (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539).
470. Id. at 858.
471. Id. at 859-60 (citing the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-1464 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); see also DONNA R. CHRISTIE, COASTAL AND OCEAN
MANAGEMENT LAW In a Nutshell 3-5, 116-18 (1994). The CZMA is designed to "preserve,
protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal
zone for this and succeeding generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1). The Act provides federal
funding to encourage the states to provide this resource protection and to control use. See
CHRISTIE, supra, at 4, 117. It requires the participating states to prepare, and submit for federal
approval, coastal management plans; once a plan is approved, the state is the final judge of
disputes, and the federal government must act consistent with the state plan. Only in the case
of national security may the federal government override the state plan. See Babbitt, supra note
11, at 860; CHRISTIE, supra, at 117. Based on the high rate of state participation (all 35 eligible
coastal states have participated), the fact that the federal government has approved all but six
state coastal management plans, and the fact that almost the entire United States coast is
governed by such a plan, the Act can be considered a success. See CHRISTIE, supra, at 117-18.
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Agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to
the fullest extent possible to reduce duplication between
NEPA and State and local requirements.... [S]uch
cooperation shall to the fullest extent possible include:
(1) Joint planning processes.
(2) Joint environmental research and studies.
(3) Joint public hearings (except where otherwise
provided by statute).
(4) Joint environmental assessments.'l
Subsection C goes on to note that: "[S]uch cooperation shall to the
fullest extent possible include joint environmental impact statements. In
such cases, one or more Federal agencies and one or more State or local
agencies shall be joint lead agencies."'473 The National Forest Management Act provides for similar " 'coordinat[ion] with State and local
governments in the promulgation of land management plans' ;474
specifically, the Forest Service must review state and local land use
plans concerning the National Forests, and consider possible conflicts
with federal plans."7 The Clean Air Act recognizes that "[fjederal
financial assistance and leadership is essential for the development of
cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and
control air pollution,"47 6 and instructs the federal government to
"encourage cooperative activities by the States and local governments.,, 4'I Likewise, the Clean Water Act requires that "[flederal
agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop
comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in
47 Even one of
concert with programs for managing water resources.""
the most controversial pieces of environmental legislation, the Endangered Species Act, "declare[s it] to be the policy of Congress that
Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve
water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered

472. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(b) (1995) (implementing regulations for the NEPA).
473. Id. § 1506.2(c).
474. See Ann Desch, "Freemarket" Land Use Planning or "Son of Sage Rebellion,"
MONTANA ASSOCIATION OF PLANNERS, July/Aug. 1992, at 20 (quoting Dale Robertson, Chief,
U.S.D.A. Forest Service). The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974
requires the Secretary of Agriculture to "develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and
resource management plans for units of the National Forest System, coordinated with the land
and resource management planning processes of State and local governments and other Federal
agencies." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (1994).
475. See Desch, supra note 474, at 20.
476. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a)(4) (1994).
477. Id. § 7402(a).
478. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1994).
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species, '' 479 and requires the federal government to "give actual notice"
of an impending regulation based on a determination that a species is
endangered or threatened "to each county or equivalent jurisdiction in
which the species is believed to occur, and invite the comment of such
agency, and each such jurisdiction theron. '48" Despite these provisions,
however, ultimately the federal agencies today are empowered to make
the final land management decisions, and need not address state or local
concerns.
But there are already examples of actual cooperative federal and
local efforts in public land initiatives. In one notable case, Catron
County, New Mexico-often called the "birthplace of the county
movement",48 -signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in
482
February 1994 with the U.S. Forest Service, Gila National Forest.
In this Memorandum of Understanding, the parties "recognized that the
Forest Service manages the National Forest" in accordance with federal
regulations, and the County did not dispute the federal government's
jurisdiction.4 3 To satisfy joint objectives for efficient and effective
action and communication on a cooperative basis, the parties agreed that
the Forest Service would mail the quarterly Environmental Analysis
Calendar and any scoping reports--detailing need for proposed
action-to the County Commission, possibly with an invitation to the

479. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (1994).
480. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii).
481. McCoy, supra note 456, at Al. Catron County contains a large amount of federallyowned land, and historically, Catron County "has often been in the vanguard" of anti-federal
rebellions; back in the 1890s, residents "torched tens of thousands of acres to protest the
government's original plan to set aside national forests." Id. Catron County was dramatically
affected in the 1980s when federal environmental protection actions impeded two of its major
industries, mining and timber. See Cheryl Probst, Catron Officials Say Work with Feds,
CHRONICLE (Omak, WA), Apr. 14, 1993, at 10. In 1991, Catron County was the first of many
counties recently to pass an ordinance asserting jurisdiction over the federal government on
federal lands. See Anita P. Miller, All Is Not Quiet on the Western Front, 25 URB. LAW. 827
(1993), for a discussion of the Catron County Land Plan; see also John Craig, County, Agencies
Agree to Cooperate-DealAimed at Averting Legal Battles, SPOKESMAN-REV., May 24, 1994,
and John Craig, Agreements Signal Peace in Land-Use Revolt-Stevens County Pacts Give
Residents Power Against Agencies, SPOKESMAN-REV., May 13, 1994, at B4. An Idaho State
Court held that a Catron County-style ordinance was in violation of both the United States and
Idaho Constitutions, in Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, CV 93-9955 (Ist Dist.
Bonner Co., Jan. 27, 1994).
482. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between Catron County Commissioners,
Catron County, New Mexico and the U.S. Forest Service, Gila National Forest, Feb. 15, 1994
(Catron County MOU).
483. Id. at 1-2. Cited were the Forest Reserve Organic Act of 1897, The Multiple Use
Sustained Yield Act, and the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act. Id.
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County to join in cooperative efforts, and the County would then
provide comments to the Forest Service, including a description of
"applicable State and local laws and local plans and policies which may
apply to the proposal or have an effect on the decision."'4 The Forest
Service also agreed to mail to the County a description of alternative
actions considered, and the County agreed to "provide quantified
information and data analyzing the impacts of the alternatives and the
relationship of the alternatives to County plans and policies." 485 All
this would happen before the usual comment and decision notification
regulations would ordinarily be triggered.486
Catron County and the Forest Service agreed to consider joint
planning as well, particularly in cases where the County has some
subject-matter jurisdiction or where the parties have similar environmental planning requirements to satisfy." 7 The Forest Service affirmed its
commitment to follow planning regulations requiring coordination with
local officials.48 ' In return, the County "recognized that the Forest
[Service] administers a large portion of the land base of the County, and
that Forest [Service] employees are members of the community and
contribute greatly to the economic stability of the County," and therefore
agreed to involve the federal agency in County planning processes.4 9
Local officials in Stevens County, Washington, worked out similar
agreements with the Forest Service, the BLM, the National Park Service,
and the Fish and Wildlife Service that dictate procedures for federal and
county sharing of information and participatory decisionmaking
processes.4" The purpose of the MOUs, according to the Stevens
County Commissioners Office, is to "allow[] local residents a constructive voice for timely comments to various federal agency actions and
policies on issues which may impact county residenes," and in
planning, to "focus[] additional federal attention upon the importance of
484. Id. at 2-4.
485, Id. at 5.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 6.
488. Id. at 7.
489. Id. at 9.
490. See "Summary of the Stevens County Community Approach to Federal Agency
Actions," presented to the Washington Association of Counties Legislative Conference, Stevens
County Commissioners Office, Sept. 19-30, 1994 (including Memoranda of Understanding
signed on or around May 23, 1994 by Stevens County Commissioners and the U.S. Forest
Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Department of Interior/BLM, and the National Park Service)
[hereinafter Stevens County Community Approach]; see also John Craig, Agreements Signal
Peace in Land-Use Revolt-Stevens County Pacts Give Residents Power Against Agencies,
SPOKsMAN-REv., May 13, 1994, at B4. The County had already signed an agreement with the
BLM in 1981, "and the BLM has generally followed it." Id.
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balancing natural resource management with the needs of the local
economy. '491' Generally, the counties appear most interested in receiving "early warning" of federal agency planning and policy formulation,
as well as in having actu al input in such efforts. 49 In Nevada, home
to the Nye County federal lands controversy, the Nevada Association of
Counties now offers a handbook entitled Public Land Use Planning
Guidelines; the booklet disdains "too much contentiousness in rural
America" and instead encourages a practical approach to federal and
county "cooperation and coordination."493
On the state level, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt has worked to
broker agreements between federal, state, ranching, and environmental
interests, and seems to have succeeded, at least in the State of Colorado.494 And many state officials, including the Nevada lawmaker who
ignited the original "Sagebrush Rebellion" in 1979, State Senator Dean
Rhoads, oppose the latest disruptive county actions.495 Rhoads believes
that "the state is on the verge of winning land concessions from the
federal government and that the new rebels are frustrating his efforts
with their moves for county control. 496 In 1995, he is hopeful that
Congress will approve legislation authorizing the establishment of
demonstration projects, whereby States can manage the public lands.497
Cooperative efforts also make sense from a practical standpoint, for
the lands controlled by the federal government, by the states, and by
private parties are intermingled and often can only be developed or
cared for through mutual arrangement. 49' For similar reasons, regional
or multi-state alliances, such as those created to address "cross-border"

491. See Stevens County Community Approach, supra note 490, at 2-3.
492. See, e.g., Cooperative Agreement Between Stevens County and Border Resource Area
Bureau of Land Management at 2, in Stevens County Community Approach, supra note 490.
493. NEVADA Ass'N OF COUNTIES, PUBLIC LAND USE PLANNING GUIDELINES i (Ist ed.,

July 1993).
494. See The Endangered West, supra note 451, at E14. With Secretary Babbitt's help, the
respective parties in Colorado "were able to agree on less destructive grazing practices." Id.; see
also Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 424. Pursuant to a 1982 Memorandum of Understanding between the State, BLM and the Forest Service, for example, the parties meet every four
months and discuss resource issues, planning decisions, and cooperative means to solve
problems. Id.
495. Vogel, supra note 77, at 14A. In 1979, Rhoads was the force behind the Nevada law
that first asserted State ownership of federal public lands. Id.
496. Id. Rhoads predicts that Nye County will lose the legal battle over its county
ordinances. Id.
497. Id.
498. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 410-11. Though the federal government owns
large amounts of land in total, much of this area is composed of small plots that intersperse with
private and state plots. See id.
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resources, can also assist both individual states and the federal government.4 " Such an alliance was created by the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act,"° for example, to consider energy requirements,
regional production capabilities, and the likely impact on the environment and the economy, and to make leasing recommendations to the
Secretary of the Interior. ° '
While agreement on sharing authority is important in the public lands
context, federal and state cooperation will not in itself solve the more
substantive dilemmas. The issues raised in the public lands context are
not easy ones; both those who seek increased economic opportunity in
development of resources, and those who seek increased protection in
preservation of resources, have responsible goals worth pursuing. The
solution rarely can be as black-and-white or bleak as either extreme
seeks to portray it.
The debate over the federal lands that comprise the "Grand Staircase" of southern Utah5" is illustrative:
To many of those who live in southern Utah, protecting
wilderness means locking up their land and their economic
future, cutting off access to energy and mineral resources
and the kind of booms that took place during uranium's
heyday. They fear that livestock grazing will be restricted
(although it is permitted in wilderness areas), that fourwheel-drive roads will be closed, that a way of life will be
destroyed so that a backpacking elite may sample the joys
of solitude.
To wilderness advocates, southern Utah is an irreplaceable jewel that is worth far more as an unspoiled landscape
than as a collection of exploitable resources."
Conservationists in the past have sponsored legislation to protect 5.7
million acres of the southern Utah land, equalling ten percent of the
state's entire mass."°4 Now, in 1995, Utah's congressional delegation

499. See id. at 427.
500. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982) (cited in Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 427).
501. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 427.
502. The "Grand Staircase" is a "cascade of white, pink and vermilion cliffs that
foreshadow the scenic glories of the Grand Canyon 50 miles to the southeast." Tom Kenworthy,
Conservation Debate Rages Over Much of Utah's "Grand Staircase," WASH. POsT, June 17,
1995, at A3. According to the Post, southern Utah "has more acreage with wilderness potential
than almost any other state in the Lower 48." Id.

503. Id.
504. Id.
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and Governor Mike Leavitt (R) have proposed legislation that would
protect only about 1.9 million acres of the land, as originally proposed
by the Bureau of Land Management during President Bush's tenure. 5
Thus, the parties stand 3.8 million acres apart.
Obviously, a dispute over what to do with so many millions of acres
of federal land is a significant one. Author Wallace Stegner described
the debate generally as " 'a conflict between the material and the
spiritual.' "" The states, filled with individuals whose livelihoods are
directly affected by the designation, can and should represent the
material side. But the states also are filled with individuals whose lives
are enhanced by the " 'original and unchanging beauty'

""

of the

public lands, and so all of the states must represent the spiritual side, as
well. In the same way, the federal government is comprised of
representatives of all individuals-businessmen, environmentalists, and
others-and must balance and protect their diverse interests. Hopefully,
new judicial and federal support for shared authority will encourage
dialogue and compromise between the various constituencies, for the
solution can only be one that appreciates all elements, both material and
spiritual. Our system of federalism, with equal states and equal citizens,
requires that we work toward nothing less.
V.

CONCLUSION

As resources appear less infinite, concern of individual states for
their respective welfare grows. Western states with large land mass but
little control over it, and little hope of meaningfully populating it, are
worried about their relative clout and the fate of their territory. 8 State
assumption of greater responsibility over federal public lands increasingly will be needed in order to compensate for shrinking federal appropriations for management of these lands."° A spending bill approved by
the Senate in August 1995, for example, would reduce the Interior

505. Id. Even this narrower protection is opposed by county officials in the affected area
of the State; some would accept protection of half this amount of land, while others "proposed
that no land from their counties be included." Id.
506. Id. (quoting Wallace Stegner in 1990).
507. Id. (quoting the words of President Lyndon B. Johnson in the original 1964 Wilderness
Act).
508. Some increase in state population has had the effect of increasing the political power
of these states in the West. The Western population rose from 28.1 million in 1960 to 43.2
million in 1980, resulting in an increased number of representatives in Congress, from 69 to 85.
See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 11, at 409-10.
509. Governor Janklow, for example, proposed that his State manage national parks within
South Dakota "as a response to threats in the Republican-controlled Congress of significant
budget cuts for the National Park Service." Mercer, supra note 464, at A8.
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Department's current $12 billion budget by $1.5 billion, cutting
programs for federal land management, national parks, Indian tribal
governments, scientific research, and wildlife refuges. 1° As Senator
Daschle warned," '[i]f there comes a time when resources become more
scarce and budgets are cut, we may be left with no option but to turn
[national] parks over to the state.' ,,51
States in the West are not the only ones worried about their standing
in the federal system. States in the heavily populated Northeast, for
example, are also worried, and some see an altogether different kind of
federalism as necessary to address these state problems. Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.)-the man "who predicted years in advance
that out-of-wedlock births would nearly destroy the black family and
that the Soviet Union would collapse" 5' 2 -now predicts that apportionment in the Senate may have to be changed, in order to protect the
Northeast States from being drained of their resources and continuously
denied relief by "coalitions of sparsely populated states with only a
fraction of their constituents. 51 3 Senator Moynihan objected that "New
York and other northeastern states have come out on the short end,
sending more tax money to Washington than they have gotten back in
federal largess."5"4 The concern, specifically, is for the stature of the
State; as Senator Moynihan put it," '[t]he influence of New York in the
nation,.,, in all the meanings of the term influence, is in jeopardy.'2515
Thus, across a broad geographic tableau, in state and federal halls of
power, and in the Supreme Court of the land, there is a sense that a
profound change must occur in the relationship between the states and
the federal government. To preserve the federal system itself, and to
protect individual components such as the public lands and resources,
a new cooperative federalism is emerging. This sharing of authority is
510. Senate Votes to Cut Interior's Budget; Land, Indian Tribes, Energy Funding Hit,
WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at A13.
511. Mercer, supra note 464, at A8 (quoting Senator Daschle). Representative Joel Hefley
(R-Co.) already has proposed closing some units of the National Park Service. Id.
512. Judith Havemann, Moynihan Poses Questions of Balance-Senate's Proven
PrognosticatorPredicts the Apportionment Issue Will Divide States, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
1995, at A15.
513. Id. Senator Moynihan's immediate cause for concern is the proposal that Congress
provide block grants to the states, to be used by the states to provide benefits to the poor. The
problem for the states with large populations is that the Senate would determine the amounts to
be distributed to each state, such that "the multitude of small states could trample the few states
with large populations." Id.
514. Id. (quoting Senator DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATES
(19th ed. 1995)).
515. Id.
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based in history and on the Constitution; it ensures and strengthens the
equal footing of each state, and hence, the United States.
But this cooperative relationship must be recognized and clearly
affirmed by the Court and by the political powers of both the states and
the federal government. The Court should apply its new federalism
philosophy to the public lands issues, encouraging federal and state
cooperation and finding federal preemption only in the most narrow and
limited instances. Federal statutes should be enforced-or rewritten if
necessary-to require more, true federal and state efforts. State and local
governments should evaluate resource issues, determine policy goals and
offer planning initiatives, so that they may be a meaningful participant
in the lands management process.
Only then will all parties engage in the same debate, in two
legitimate legislative forums, rather than each faction doing battle alone,
triumphant perhaps, but within only one forum. Realization of this new
federalism in the public lands will not destroy the foundations of our
landed society. Rather, it is the balance of powers, the independence and
interchange of two governments, that will allow our system of federalism to be truly representative and protective of the will of the people.
Almost two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall declared that "no
political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the
lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American
' In an identical sense, no one-not
people into one common mass."516
the Framers, not the federal government, and certainly not the
States-has ever contemplated a portrait of America that has no states,
but simply has one common land mass. All lands within this country fall
within a state's borders. By this fact, our system is a federal system, at
all times a system of two powers, state and federal.
As constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has noted, "[i]f states are
to have any real meaning, Congress must also be prevented from acting
in ways that would leave a state formally intact but functionally a gutted
shell."5" 7 Contrary to the founders' intent, Congress has deprived the
western states of vast degrees of their power over much of the land
within their borders, prompting concerns about the relative authority of
these states in the federal system that cannot simply be dismissed. A
meaningful federalism in the public lands can begin the process of
redressing this historical disparity. And as a partner in authority, the
states and their citizens instead can focus their energies on finding
effective measures that meet the diverse agendas of the state and the

516. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403, quoted in United States Term Limits, 115 S.
Ct. at 1872 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
517. TRIBE, supra note 89, § 5-20, at 388.
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nation, as they and the federal government address the resource
problems of the day.
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